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JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered by Utah's Fifth Judicial
District Court, St. George Department, Washington County. This Court has appellate
jurisdiction under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and Utah Code § 78A-3102(3)G). This Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals but recalled the case
on November 20, 2015.
ISSUES PRESENTED

I.

Whether ReconTrust Company, N.A., a national bank, had authority to exercise
the power of sale in a non-judicial foreclosure sale for a property located in Utah
where it was appointed as successor trustee under the deed of trust.

II.

Whether, if ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise the power of sale for
properties located in Utah, such a foreclosure sale is void if the defaulted borrower
suffered no harm or prejudice in having a national bank exercise the power of sale
instead of a Utah attorney or title insurance company, and the defaulted borrower
failed to object until months after the sale.
In reviewing whether dismissal of the unlawful-detainer claim was appropriate,

the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness, according the trial court
no particular deference." Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., Inc., 2007 UT App 406, ,I 14, 176
P.3d 446 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). The trial court's
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See id.
The issue of ReconTrust's authority to exercise the power of sale was preserved in
the Opposition to Samuel Adamson's Motion to Dismiss filed by Distressed Asset
Solutions Fund, LLC ("Distressed Asset"). See R. 106-07. That issue also was the basis
for the trial court's dismissal order. See R. 403. The issue of the validity of the sale
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conducted by ReconTrust was preserved in Distressed Asset's Opposition to Adamson's
Motion for a Declaratory Judgment. See R. 301-09; see also R. 402-19.

DETERMINATIVE FEDERAL AND UTAH STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
12 U.S.C. § 92a -Trust powers
[Section 92a(a) and (b) provide:]
(a) Authority of Comptroller of the Currency.
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by
special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or
local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds,
guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State
banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come into competition with national
banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is
located.
(b) Grant and exercise of powers deemed not in contravention of State or local law.
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or all of
the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which
compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such powers by national
banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within the meaning
of this section.

12 C.F.R. § 9.7 -Multi-state fiduciary operations.
(a) Acting in a fiduciary capacity in more than one state. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 92a and this section, a national bank may act in a fiduciary capacity in any state. If a
{37083362;1 }2
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national bank acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity in a particular state, the
bank may act in the following specific capacities:
(1) Any of the eight fiduciary capacities expressly listed in 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a),

unless the state prohibits its own state banks, trust companies, and other corporations that
compete with national banks in that state from acting in that capacity; and
(2) Any other fiduciary capacity the state permits for its own state banks, trust
companies, or other corporations that compete with national banks in that state.
(b) Serving customers in other states. While acting in a fiduciary capacity in one
state, a national bank may market its fiduciary services to, and act as fiduciary for,
customers located in any state, and it may act as fiduciary for relationships that include
property located in other states. The bank may use a trust representative office for this
purpose.
(c) Offices in more than one state. A national bank with fiduciary powers may
establish trust offices or trust representative offices in any state.
(d) Determination of the state referred to in 12 USC. § 92a. For each :fiduciary
relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the state in which the bank acts in a
fiduciary capacity for that relationship. A national bank acts in a fiduciary capacity in the
state in which it accepts the fiduciary appointment, executes the documents that create the
fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or
distribution of fiduciary assets. If these activities take place in more than one state, then
the state in which the bank acts in a :fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the
state that the bank designates from among those states.
{37083362;1 }3

(e) Application of state law-(]) State laws used in section 92a. The state laws
that apply to a national bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C.§ 92a are the
laws of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity.
(2) Other state laws. Except for the state laws made applicable to national banks
by virtue of 12 U.S.C.§ 92a, state laws limiting or establishing preconditions on the
exercise of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national banks.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-802.5 - Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale.

A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful detainer

if the person:
(I) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being
served with a notice to quit by the purchaser.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-1-21-Trustees of trust deeds -Qualifications.

[Sections (l)(a) and (3) provide:]
(1)
(a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state
where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to:
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the obligation
secured by the trust deed;
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(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust deed
and by law;
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust deed; or
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the
property secured by the trust deed;
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance company
authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the laws of
Utah or the United States;
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually conducting a
trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that:
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 3 lA, Insurance Code, to
conduct insurance business in the state;
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state.
(v) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm
Credit Administration or its successor.

****
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee
of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv).

{37083362;1 }5

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-1-23-Sale of trust property- Power of trustee - Foreclosure
of trust deed.

The trustee who is qualified under Subsections 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in
the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without
express provision for it in the trust deed.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-23.5 - Civil liability for unauthorized person who exercises

power of sale
(I) As used in this section:
(a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee under
Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv).
(b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an unauthorized
person.
(2)
(a) An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to the trustor
for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the unauthorized sale
or $2,000, whichever is greater.
(b) In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff the
plaintiff's costs and attorney fees.

{3 7083362; I} 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves ReconTrust's authority, as appointed successor trustee under
a deed of trust, to exercise the power of sale in a non-judicial foreclosure sale for
properties located in Utah-and, if it lacks that power, the validity of a non-judicial
foreclosure sale of Utah property that it conducts, as well as the resulting trustee's deed.
On February 7, 2014, a bona fide purchaser of the property, Distressed Asset, filed
~

an unlawful-detainer action against the occupants, Samuel and Courtney Adamson, in
Utah's Fifth Judicial District Court, St. George Department, Washington County. See R.
1-6. At a bench trial on August 7, 2014, Distressed Asset presented evidence that it
obtained the property through a quitclaim deed executed by Bank of America, N.A.
("BANA"), and that BANA acquired the property through a trustee's sale conducted by
ReconTrust, a national bank. See Trial Exs. 1-3; Trial Tr. 20:1-17. Distressed Asset
also presented a stipulated order wherein the parties agreed that the Adamsons remained
in possession of the property since the sale, and that they continued to remain in
possession of the property after receiving notices to quit.
order); Trial Tr. 20:24-21 :7.

See R. 371-72 (stipulated

After Distressed Asset rested its case, the trial judge

,·:.,

~

concluded that the documents admitted into evidence "make out a prima facie case for
unlawful detainer." Trial Tr. 21 :23-25; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-802.5.
During the Adamsons' case-in-chief, Samuel Adamson testified that before the
sale date, he received a copy of the notice of default and election to sell executed by
ReconTrust, but he did not call or otherwise contact ReconTrust before the sale regarding
the notice.

See Trial Tr. 27:10-17, 29:1-5, 32:25-33:13.
{37083362; I }7

Specifically, they did not

attempt to contact ReconTrust before the sale, did not seek an injunction to stop the sale,
and did not attend the sale, all despite being aware that the sale was scheduled. See Trial
Tr. 29:1-33:13. The Adamsons presented no evidence that they were prejudiced by
having ReconTrust exercise the power of sale instead of a Utah attorney or title insurance
company.
On September 2, 2014, the trial court dismissed the case, holding that Distressed
Asset was unable to "overcome Defendants' defense that there has been no 'disposition
of the property by the trustee's sale"' conducted by ReconTrust. See R. 419. The court
concluded that because Federal National Mortgage Ass 'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 311
P.3d 1004, held that ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise the power of sale, the sale
conducted by ReconTrust was void. See R. 404, 410-12. The court entered a final
appealable order on September 2, 2014, see R. 434-35, and Distressed Asset noted its
appeal, see R. 421-22.
BANA purchased the property from Distressed Asset on January 6, 2015, and filed
a motion to substitute BANA for Distressed Asset as appellant in this case. The Court of
Appeals granted that motion.
This Court recalled the case from the Court of Appeals after that court held oral
argument, but before it issued an opinion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2007, Samuel Adamson financed the purchase of property located at 70 West
Orchard Lane, Washington, Utah 84780 ("the property"). See R. 2; Trial Tr. 24:11-12.

{37083362;1}8

He executed a deed of trust granting Guild Mortgage Company a secured interest in the
property that same day. See R. 2; Trial Tr. 25: 16-21; Trial Ex. 4.
The trial court record reflects that Adamson subsequently defaulted on the note
and has not made any loan payments since 2008. See R. 415 n.7; Trial Tr. 39:3-9.
ReconTrust was appointed substitute trustee under the deed of trust. See R. 8-9; Add. at
A-38. 1 As a result of the default, ReconTrust executed and properly recorded a notice of
~

default and election to sell. See R. 2; Trial Ex. 1. In January 2010, the property was sold
at a non-judicial foreclosure sale to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BAC-HLS"),
FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP for the sum of $278,530.03. See Trial Ex.
2.

Although Adamson had received prior notice of the sale date, see Trial Tr. 32:2133:13, he never tried to contact ReconTrust before the scheduled sale date, see Trial Tr.
29:1-15. He also did not attend the scheduled sale. See Trial Tr. 30: 14-17.
ReconTrust executed and properly recorded a trustee's deed after the trustee's
sale. See Trial Ex. 2. Since the sale, the Adamsons have continued to occupy the

This Court may take judicial notice of the recorded substitution of trustee. See
McGarry v. Thompson, 201 P.2d 288,291 (Utah 1948).
{37083362;1} 9
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property, have failed to pay taxes on the property, and have not recorded a lis pen dens
against the property. See R. 5, 371-72; Trial Tr. 37:20-24. 2
BANA, as successor by merger to BAC-HLS, transferred title to Distressed Asset
via a quitclaim deed. See Trial Ex. 3. Distressed Asset provided consideration for the
property without notice of any claims to the property. See R. 3; Trial Ex. 3. In 2014,
Distressed Asset served a notice to quit on the Adamsons, notifying them that it had
elected to terminate their tenancy at will and that failure to vacate within five days would
result in the filing of an unlawful detainer action. See R. 15-21, 3 71-72. The A damsons
failed to vacate the property. See R. 5, 371-72.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ReconTrust has the authority to exercise the power of sale for properties in Utah,
based on 12 U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. This Court's decision to the contrary in

Sundquist was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
Even if Sundquist is not overruled, the trial court erred in concluding that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale and resulting trustee's deed executed by ReconTrust are void.
The court's decision is premised on case law that is inapplicable to these facts and a
treatise that conflicts with Utah law. Prior decisions from this Court make clear that the

2

Ten months after the foreclosure sale, Samuel Adamson filed a putative class
action against ReconTrust in federal court to challenge ReconTrust's authority to exercise
the power of sale. See R. 107; Trial Tr. 36:9-25; Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., Jf.A., No.
2: 10-cv-1099 (D. Utah). That lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice because the plaintiffs
failed to comply with a show-cause order requiring the plaintiffs to provide the court with
a status of the case after months of delay, and with their intentions to proceed. See Order,
Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., NA., No. 2:10-cv-1099 (D. Utah Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No.
142.
{37083362;1}
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Adamsons cannot have the foreclosure sale set aside without proof that their interests in
the property were sacrificed or there were unjust extremes from any violation of the Trust
Deed Act. The Adamsons offered no such evidence. Moreover, they are precluded from
even challenging the validity of the sale because they failed to object to ReconTrust's
authority until months after the sale occurred. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the
dismissal of Distressed Asset's unlawful detainer action.
ARGUMENT

I.

Sundquist Was Wrongly Decided And Should Be Overruled.

The trial court relied on this Court's decision in Federal National Mortgage Ass 'n
v. Sundquist that ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise the power of sale for properties

in Utah because federal law does not preempt Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23. But
Sundquist conflicts with the conclusions of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit, the federal Office of Comptroller of the Currency ("the OCC"), and the
U.S. Solicitor General, all of which have stated that 12 U.S.C. § 92a and its implementing
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, preempt Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 and authorize
ReconTrust to exercise the power of sale for properties located in Utah. See Garrett v.
ReconTrust Co., 546 F. App'x 736 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion); OCC's

Amicus Brief, Dutcher v. Matheson, No. 12-4150 (10th Cir. July 15, 2013) (Add. at A-39
to -63); U.S. Solicitor General's Amicus Brief, Fed. Nat'! Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, No.
13-852 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2014) (Add. at A-64 to -92).
As these authorities explained, Section 92a states that, "when not in contravention
of state or local law," a national bank may exercise fiduciary powers that are granted to
{37083362;1} 11

state banks, trust companies, or other corporations that compete with national banks
"under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a).
Section 9.7(d) of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations clarifies that "the state
referred to in section 92a," i.e., the state where the national bank is "located," is the state
where a bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity." The regulation further defines the state in
which the bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity" as the state in which the bank conducts
three activities with respect to the specific fiduciary relationship at issue.
The OCC and Solicitor General both noted that Section 9. 7 is a reasonable
interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a. See Add. at A-57; Add. at A-82 to -83. Applying
Section 9. 7, the Tenth Circuit, the OCC, and the Solicitor General interpreted that
provision as allowing ReconTrust to exercise the power of sale on properties located in
Utah because ReconTrust is located in Texas, and Texas law allows ReconTrust to
exercise that power. See Garrett, 546 F. App'x at 740-42; Add. at A-52 to -58; Add. at
A-81 to -85.

Indeed, the Solicitor General specifically noted that Sundquist was

incorrect. See Add. at A-81 ("The Utah Supreme Court held that, at least in cases
involving the sale of real property, the national bank's authority to perform trust
functions must instead be determined under the law of the State where the property is
located. That holding is incorrect.").
Given these significant legal developments, this Court should overrule Sundquist,
recognize that federal law preempts Utah law regarding a national bank's authority to
exercise the power of sale, and affinn ReconTrust's authority to exercise the power of
sale for the foreclosed property in this case.
{37083362;1}
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II.

The Trial Court Applied The Wrong Test When It Declared The Trustee's
Deed Void.

Even if this Court does not overrule Sundquist, it should still hold that the trial
court erred in dismissing the unlawful-detainer action because the trustee's deed issued
by ReconTrust is valid. As further explained in Part II.B below, Utah's jurisprudence has

long held that a debtor must meet a high threshold to set aside a foreclosure sale based on
a violation of the Trust Deed Act. See Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). Beginning with Concepts, this Court has held that "[a] sale
once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there
was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing" and the process "reach[ ed] unjust extremes."
Id. at 1159-60. This high bar for setting aside a foreclosure sale was reaffirmed by this

Court in Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ,I 36, 86 P.3d 699, and has been consistently
applied in Utah appellate court cases, including a case involving a non-judicial
foreclosure sale conducted by a person who had not even been appointed trustee, see
Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 1if 14-15, 285 P.3d 7. Rather than applying this

line of cases, which squarely address the impact of violations of the Trust Deed Act, the
~

trial court relied on (I) a case that predates the Utah Trust Deed Act and another that
focused primarily on the Condominium Ownership Act, and (2) a real estate treatise that
conflicts with Utah law.

{37083362;1}
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A.

The Trial Court Relied On Case Law And A Secondary Source That
Do Not Apply In This Case.
1.

Singer Is Inapplicable.

This Court has decided no cases that support the Adamsons' position that the
trustee's deed is void, whereas this Court's decision in Concepts directly answers the
question in this case. See infra Part II.B. The trial court mistakenly relied on Singer

Manufacturing Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542 (1880), a 135-year-old case that pre-dates
the Utah Trust Deed Act and Utah statehood itself. As an initial matter, the trial court
erred in treating Singer as binding precedent. Singer was decided by the Utah Territorial
Supreme Court-not, as the trial court stated, by the Utah Supreme Court. See R. 405,
411-12. And the Utah Territory derived its authority from Congress, whereas the State
of Utah derives its authority from the people of Utah.

See State ex rel. Bishop v.

McNally, 43 P. 920, 920 (Utah 1896). Decisions of a court instituted by one sovereign
are not binding on courts of a different sovereign. Cf Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819,
825 (N.D. 1968) (noting that an issue was "a matter of first impression in this state since
statehood" and treating a decision from the territorial court as only persuasive authority).
Even if Singer were binding, it still would not apply here because of important
factual differences between that case and this one.

In Singer, a sheriffs sale was

declared invalid because the auctioneer who cried the sale was not the appointed trustee
and was not authorized to act as trustee under the deed of trust. See 2 Utah at 54 7. In
other words, tlie auctioneer of the sale had no legal relationship and owed no duties to the
trustee, trustor, or beneficiary of the deed of trust and had no reason to believe he could

{37083362;1}

14

sell the property. In contrast, ReconTrust was duly appointed by the beneficiary under
the deed of trust to act as successor trustee. See Add. at A-38. It was qualified under
Utah statutes to serve as a trustee because it is authorized by federal law to conduct trust
business and conducted trust business in Utah. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-21(l)(a)(iii)
(explaining that a qualified trustee includes "any corporation authorized to conduct a trust
business and actually conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the
~

United States"). 3 As trustee, ReconTrust owed legal duties to both the Adamsons and the
beneficiary of the trust deed, ivffiRS. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P .2d 298, 302
(Utah 1978). It also held legal title to the property by virtue of its status as trustee. See

General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429,432 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-19(4)). Even if ReconTrust exceeded its statutory authority by
conveying that title, such an ultra vires act would not be void unless it violated public
policy. See Millard Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank of Millard Cty., 14 P .2d 967, 971-72

3

Although this Court held in Sundquist that ReconTrust lacked the power of sale,
ReconTrust is still a qualified trustee under Utah Code§ 57-l-21(1)(a)(iii) because it is a
corporation authorized to conduct trust business and actually conducting such business
under the laws of the United States. The Adamsons' counsel conceded below that
ReconTrust was authorized by Utah law to conduct certain trustee activities such as
executing the notice of default, without exercising the power of sale. See Trial Tr. 73 :511.
{37083362; I} 15

(Utah 1932) (holding that a bank's ultra vires act did not render securities void). 4 Given
this critical factual distinction, Singer does not apply here.
Further, because Singer did not involve a violation of the Trust Deed Act (which
was adopted approximately eighty years after Singer), the debtors there did not need to
establish the heightened level of proof that applied in Concepts.

The Adamsons,

however, rely exclusively on ReconTrust's alleged vjolation of the Trust Deed Act to
have the sale here set aside. They thus must prove that their interests were "sacrificed or

there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing."

Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160

(emphasis added); see also infra Part II.B. There was no such showing in this case. See
infra Part III.

In Singer, moreover, there are no facts suggesting that the debtors had prior notice
of the auctioneer's identity because the appointed trustee was someone other than the
auctioneer. Without such prior notice, the debtors did not have the opportunity to object
to the auctioneer's authority to conduct the sale. See Singer, 2 Utah at 547. Therefore,
there was no remedy available to the debtors other than seeking to have the sale set aside
after it occurred. The Adamsons, in contrast, were afforded prior written notice, through
Q

the notice of default and election to sell, that ReconTrust would conduct the sale. See
Trial Tr. 27:10-17; 32:25-33:13 (Samuel Adamson testifying that the notice of default

4

The public policy of requiring a trustee who exercises the power of sale to be
physically present in Utah seeks to make it easier for borrowers to meet with the trustee
before a foreclosure sale occurs. That policy could not have been violated in this case
when the borrower did not even attempt to contact the trustee. See infra Part II.B.3
(discussing this purpose); supra Statement of Facts (noting that the Adamsons never
attempted to contact ReconTrust).
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was taped to his door before the sale date); Trial Ex. 1; see also Reynolds, 2012 UT App
206,

~

15 (explaining that the notice of default "inform[s] persons with an interest in the

property of the pending sale of that property, so that they may act to protect those
interests" (quoting Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159)). Therefore, unlike the debtors in Singer,
there is evidence that the Adamsons had an opportunity to object to the sale before it
occurred.
2.

McQueen Is Also Inapplicable.

The trial court also erred in relying on McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes
Owners Ass'n, 2013 UT App 53, 298 P.3d 666, because that case is also factually

distinguishable.
First, McQueen was about the Condominium Ownership Act's requirements for
non-judicial foreclosures of assessment liens. In fact, the court twice defined the issue on
appeal to be the extent to which portions of the Trust Deed Act were incorporated into the
Condominium Ownership Act given the latter Act's requirement that "a lien for
nonpayment of a condominium unit assessment may be enforced through foreclosure or
sale according to the law of deeds of trust or mortgages." McQueen, 2013 UT App 53, ,r
9. The court specifically considered whether the Trust Deed Act's requirement that a
trustee be appointed should also apply to a condominium unit assessment-lien
foreclosure.

See id. ,r,I 11, 15. And in the context of such a foreclosure, the court

determined that the sale was invalid without an appointed trustee. See id. iJ 21. The court
improperly went beyond the limited issue presented regarding the applicability of
portions of the Trust Deed Act and instead decided the validity of the sale. Compare id.
{37083362;1}
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121, with id. ,~ 9, 10. Further, the court did not address the impact of violating the Trust
Deed Act .in a trust-deed foreclosure and therefore did not even mention, analyze, or
distinguish Concepts or its progeny. It did not address specifically whether the lack of an
appointed trustee of a trust deed would invalidate a trust-deed foreclosure, and no
subsequent appellate court case has applied McQueen in such a manner.
Second, McQueen involved a sale that was declared invalid because, unlike the
sale in this case, it was conducted by a person who was never appointed trustee and who
served as the attorney for the entity conducting the sale. See id.

,r,r 20-21. 5

Indeed, the

McQueen court's brief discussion of why the sale in that case was void turned entirely on
the fact that no trustee at all had been appointed.

See id.

The McQueen court

emphasized the importance of having an "independent third party who c[ ould]
objectively execute [the] foreclosure" and fulfill the duties owed to the debtor/trustor,
given that non-judicial foreclosures are conducted "in the absence of judicial oversight"
and "without judicial intervention." Id. 'IT 21. Lack of an independent trustee could, for
example, lead to an inadequate sale price at the trustee's sale, as happened in McQueen,
when the condo sold for a mere $3,312.76. See id.

CU

3. Here, by contrast, ReconTrust

was properly appointed by the beneficiary to serve as the substitute trustee. See Add. at
A-38. And there is no evidence in the record that ReconTrust was not independent or
that it failed to fulfill its duties owed to the Adamsons when it conducted the sale. Unlike

5

In fact, the attorney who conducted the sale was the attorney who argued the case
in the Court of Appeals-meaning that that person was far from an "independent third
party." McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, 2013 UT App 53, ,r 21,
298 P .3d 666.
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the attorney in McQueen, ReconTrust's role as trustee did not result in an inadequate sale
price, as the property sold for $278,530.03-almost $23,000 more than the amount
borrowed to purchase the property. See Trial Ex. 2; Add. at A-20.
Third, the McQueen opinion did not cite or appear to take into consideration this
Court's ruling in Concepts, nor any other cases that followed Concepts. And as the trial
court recognized, see R. 406, McQueen is in tension with Reynolds (which relied on
··A

¥iii

Concepts), an earlier decision that the McQueen panel had no authority to overrule. See,
e.g., J. W. v. State, 2005 UT App 382, ,r 10, 122 P.3d 679 (discussing stare decisis).

Fourth, in McQueen the appointment of a trustee was a "n~cessary pre-requisite"
to be able to convey the property in trust, as required by the Condominium Ownership
Act. See McQueen, 2013 UT App 53, ,r,I 30-31 (Voros, J., concurring). A trust deed like
the one in this case, however, conveys title to the property to a trustee as soon as the trust
deed is executed.

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-19(3) (providing that a trust deed

"convey[s] real property to a trustee in trust"); id. § 57-1-19(4) (defining a trustee as a
"person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed"). In other words, the
"necessary prerequisite" to "convey[ing] . . . the property in trust" in the trust-deed
context occurs as soon as the trust deed is executed and not when a trustee is appointed.
See McQueen, 2013 UT App 53,

,r 31.

Therefore, McQueen's holding as to the

importance of appointing a trustee in the assessment-lien context should not be applied t.o
the appointment of a substitute trustee in the trust-deed context.
Finally, McQueen' s holding should not apply here because it would represent a
significant change in the common law regarding voiding non-judicial foreclosure sales
{37083362;1}
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and the resulting trustee's deeds. Such changes are not automatically retroactive, and this
Court has held that they will not be applied retroactively when the "overruled law has
been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden." Exxon
C01p. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2010 UT 16,, 7, 228 P.3d 1246 (quoting Loyal Order
of Moose, # 259 v. Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982)). Given the
federal authority on which ReconTrust relied in good faith to exercise the power of sale,
see infra Part II.B.3 (citing cases and other authorities), applying McQueen retroactively
to undo the sale and hold any subsequent deed invalid would be not only burdensome to
original owners, subsequent purchasers (including bona fide purchasers), and Utah
county recorders, but also unfair and detrimental to a well-ordered system of land
ownership, see infi--a Part II.B.2 (explaining the importance of requiring a debtor to meet
a high bar to set aside a sale).
In the Court of Appeals, the Adamsons argued that McQueen created a three-part
test for determining the validity of a trustee's deed: "1) creation of a trust relationship; 2)
a qualified trustee; and 3) the adherence to correct procedural requirements." Appellees'
COA Br. 11. Utah courts have never adopted such a test. The three-part test that the
G

Adamsons posit for determining whether a deed is void evidently rests on the following
language from McQueen: "The Trust Deed Act, in addition to other procedural
requirements like proper notice, requires the creation of a trust relationship and the
appointment of a qualified trustee." 2013 UT App 53,

iJ 11.

But nothing in this sentence

refers to the validity of the foreclosure sale, i.e., McQueen does not address the
consequences for failing to comply with the requirements that the sentence lays out.
{37083362; I }20

Even if McQueen did provide a three-part test, ReconTrust meets all three parts.
The Adamsons do not contest that a trust relationship was created. See Appellees' COA
Br. 1I. And ReconTrust was a qualified trustee under § 57-l-2l(l)(a)(iii), even if it
lacked the power of sale under § 57-1-23. See supra note 3. As to the third prong, the
Adamsons claimed that a deed is voidable if a debtor proves that his interests were
sacrificed by a trustee's violation of a procedural requirement in the Utah Trust Deed
~

Act. See Appellees' COA Br. 16. They stated in conclusory fashion that ReconTrust
"ignored [their] rights and interests as trustors, and that [they] were not treated fairly."
Appellees' COA Br. 12. As explained further below, however, no evidence in the record
supports this assertion. See infi"a Part III.
3.

The Real Estate Finance Treatise Conflicts With Utah Law, And
The Trial Court Misapplied It.

The trial court also relied improperly on a real estate finance treatise that conflicts
with Utah law concerning void and voidable deeds. Specifically, the court relied on
language in the treatise that a void defect occurs when "someone other than the named
trustee conducts the sale, including a successor who has not been validly appointed,"
\ifJ

whereas a voidable error is "an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale and
must be substantial or result in a probable unfairness." R. 408 (quoting Grant S. Nelson,
Dale A. Whitman, et al., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW§ 7:21 at 953-57 (6th ed. 2014)).
The trial court posited that "Singer clearly takes its place in the first category [of void
deeds], and the prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and
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Reynolds are seen to be applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering
a sale voidable rather than void." R. 409. This analysis is incorrect.
As an initial matter, the treatise's definition of a void deed conflicts with Utah law.

It fails to include Utah law's requirement that a deed must offend public policy or harm
the public to be deemed void. See Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 119, 189 P.3d 51.
Indeed, there are no known Utah appellate cases that have adopted the treatise's
definition of void and voidable. Put simply, the treatise should not have played any role
in the trial court's ruling. See Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2015 UT 11, 1122-23,
347 P.3d 385 (refusing to adopt a property treatise that conflicted with Utah law).
Moreover, even if the treatise were consistent with Utah law, the trial court erred
in concluding that the sale conducted by ReconTrust fit within the treatise's definition of
a void sale. Again, the treatise states that a sale is void "when someone other than the
named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor who has not been validly
appointed." R. 408 (citation omitted). ReconTrust, however, conducted the sale after it
was validly appointed as trustee-facts that the Adamsons did not dispute at trial.
Therefore, the sale conducted by ReconTrust does not fit within the treatise's definition
of a void sale.
B.

Concepts And Its Progeny Provide The Rule For This Case.

The proper test for determining whether a foreclosure sale should be set aside was
established by this Court in Concepts and later applied in Utah appellate court cases.
That rule is not only well established, but also well reasoned.

{37083362;1}22

r\
~

1.

This State Has Long Required A Debtor To Meet A High Bar.

This Court has established a high standard for setting aside a foreclosure sale,
explaining that "[t]he remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which
reach unjust extremes." Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ,r 36 (citing Concepts, 743 P.2d
at 1159). A foreclosure sale is presumed valid and will not be set aside unless the debtor
proves that "the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud
~

or unfair dealing." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160 (emphasis omitted). Explaining this rule
further, the Court of Appeals noted that "substantial inadequacy of price, coupled with
fraud, mistake, or other unfair dealing can be the basis for setting aside a foreclosure
sale." Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting First Nat'!
Bank v. Haymond, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (Utah 1936)). Indeed, this Court has recognized

that a contract, such as a deed, is void ab initio only when it "offend[s] public policy or
harm[s] the public." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,r 19.
The Court of Appeals' decision in Reynolds v. Woodall illustrates this rule; that
case involved facts similar to this case, in that the person who conducted the sale had
"questionable authority" to do so, as the trial court acknowledged. R. 405. Based on this
Court's decisions in Concepts and Timm, Reynolds affirmed a trial court's decision that a
trustee's sale was valid even though the sale was conducted without a properly appointed
trustee.

See 2012 UT App 206,

,r 18.

Of particular importance here, the Court of

Appeals recognized the importance of a debtor acting to protect his interests in the
property before the non-judicial foreclosure sale occurs. The individual who recorded the
notice of default and election to sell, and who exercised the power of sale, did so before
{37083362; l }23

the beneficiary executed and recorded the substitution of trustee. See id.

'TT

13. Despite

the trustee's violation of Utah Code§ 57-1-22 and the lack of a validly appointed trustee
at the time of the sale, the court held that the borrower had failed to meet her burden of
proving that the sale should be declared void. See id.

,r 18. 6

The court focused on the

borrower's failure to allege in her complaint how the late substitution of trustee sacrificed
her rights or resulted in any unfair dealing. See id. The court explained that the borrower
failed to allege that she was denied any right to cure the default, that she ever planned to
cure the default or was capable of doing so, or that the trustee's actions affected the
bidding or sale price. See id. These factors are also present in this case. 7 Because this
Court had ~ade clear that a non-judicial foreclosure sale will be set aside only in cases
involving unjust extremes, the Court of Appeals explained that "the proper remedy is to
seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge irregularities and

6

Although the person who was acting as trustee in Reynolds could have exercised
the power of sale had he been appointed, he lacked the authority to do so at the time of
the sale because he had not been appointed trustee. Given this lack of appointment, that
person was in weaker position legally to transfer title of the property than ReconTrust at
the time of the sale in this case.
7

For example, the Adamsons never attempted to contact ReconTrust before the
sale, see Trial Tr. 29:4-5, and did not attend the sale, see Trial Tr. 30:1-3. And there was
no evidence that they could have cured the default or that the sale price was lower
because ReconTrust exercised the power of sale.
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protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is executed and
delivered to the purchaser." Id.

,r 15. 8

Reynolds is the latest in a long line of cases upholding a trustee's sale despite

violations of the Utah Trust Deed Act, because there was no evidence of fraud, unfair
dealing, or harm to the person seeking to set aside the sale. See, e.g., Timm, 2003 UT 47,

~,r 36-37 (notice of sale not sent via certified or registered mail);
~

Concepts, 743 P.2d at

1159-60 (typographical error in the notice of trustee's sale as to the year the sale would
occur); RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290,

,r,r 16-18,

263 P.3d 1152

(notice of default filed by substitute trustee before notice of substitution of trustee was
filed); Occidental/Neb. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 219-20 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (notice of default and election to sell erroneously described property and notice of
sale was mailed before three-month waiting period lapsed); cf Pierucci v. US. Bank, NA,
2015 UT App 80,

~

14, 347 P.3d 837 (applying Concepts to a case that involved

challenges to a foreclosure sale based on the trustee's alleged failure to accept
modification payments).
2.

This High Bar Serves Important Purposes.

Requiring "heightened proof' that a debtor was prejudiced by some
noncompliance with the Trust Deed Act to set aside a foreclosure sale promotes
important ends. First, it serves to protect the interests of bona fide purchasers-both
8

The trial court did not apply the rule from Reynolds, however, because the trial
court believed it was bound by Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542
(1880). As explained in Part II.A.I, Singer is readily distinguishable from this case and
was not even binding precedent, given that it was decided by the Utah Territorial
Supreme Court.
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initial purchasers and subsequent ones.

As this Court has explained, "[o]ur statutes

protect a bona fide purchaser at a public sale under a trust deed, by permitting him to rely
on the recitals in the deed he receives from the trustee after the sale." Blodgett, 590 P.2d
at 303. Hence, there is a "presumption that a trustee's deed, which states that it complies
with the statutory requirements, is 'conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers'
of the trustee's deed's validity." RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ,I 17 n.5 (quoting
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-l-28(2)(c)(ii)).
Second, it ensures that non-judicial foreclosure sales are more likely to have fair
bids. As the Court of Appeals has recognized, "[t]he requirement that the trustor raise
any issues prior to sale is consistent with the importance of protecting the validity of
trustee's deeds, thus promoting bidding at trustee's sales and improving the chances that
a sale will be for fair market value." Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206,

,r 16.

This rule

promotes bidding at fair market value because bidders know that if any problem existed
with the sale, the trustor will have been required to have raised the issue before the bidder
could purchase the property.
Third, this rule avoids disrupting ownership of land. As the Court of Appeals has
acknowledged, "[w]hen . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for finality is at its
apex." Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. lnt'l Inv. & Dev. Corp., 1999 UT App 232,

,r 10, 986

P.2d 765. This need is protected by ensuring that the debtor cannot use a violation of the
Trust Deed Act-that ultimately made no difference on the outcome of the sale-to set
aside the sale and disrupt titles to land.
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Fourth, this rule complements the "statutory right to cure the default, which also
must be exercised during the three-month grace period before a trustee's sale is held."
Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206,

,r 16

(emphasis omitted). Given that the Trust Deed Act

provides specific procedures for challenging a foreclosure sale, any remedies for
violating that Act should not excuse a borrower's failure to comply with the Act.
3.

This High Bar Is Appropriate For Sales Conducted By An
Appointed, Qualified Trustee Without The Power Of Sale.

This high bar of setting aside a non-judicial foreclosure sale should apply to sales
conducted by an appointed, qualified trustee who lacked the power of sale. Notably,
nowhere in the Trust Deed Act did the State Legislature declare that any type of violation
of the Act invalidates a sale. Indeed, such a harsh result-particularly after a trustee's
sale has taken place and the property has been purchased by a bona fide purchaserwould undermine the confidence of Utah citizens to purchase property in a foreclosure
sale. Moreover, it is incompatible with the State Legislature's view of this issue, which is
reflected in its 2011 adoption of Utah Code § 57-1-23.5.

This statute allows a

debtor/trustor to recover monetary damages for a sale conducted by an unauthorized
~

person equal to the greater of actual damages or $2,000, in addition to costs and
attorney's fees. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-1-23.5(2)(a). 9
Allowing a sale to be voided absent fraud or other extreme circumstances is
particularly unwarranted when a violation of the Trust Deed Act resulted from an act

9

This statute was enacted after the sale in this case, and does not apply
retroactively. It does, however, provide constructive insight into the Legislature's view
of how this precise issue should be addressed.
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undertaken in good faith. When ReconTrust exercised the power of sale in this case, this
Court had not decided Sundquist. Indeed, at the time ReconTrust was exercising the
power of sale in this case, no case had held that Recon Trust lacked the authority to do
so-and ReconTrust' s view of its authority was later ratified by multiple decisions from
federal courts. See, e.g., Garrett, 546 F. App'x at 737; Baker v. BAC Home Loans

Servicing LP, No. 2: 11-cv-00720 CW, 2012 WL 464024, at *4 (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2012)
(not reported); Dutcher v. Matheson, No. 2:ll-CV-666 TS, 2012 WL 423379, at *4-8
(D. Utah Feb. 8, 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 733 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.

2013).
Further, the purpose of limiting who can serve as a qualified trustee with the
power of sale is not undermined by this rule. As the Tenth Circuit made clear, the
purpose of Utah Code § 57-1-21 is to "[m]ak[e] it easier for Utahns to meet with
trustees." Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Jones,
761 P.2d at 41 n.2 ("The detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real
property under Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-23 to -34 (1986) are intended to protect the
debtor/truster." (citing Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160)). In other words, the Trust Deed Act
is intended simply to provide a shield to a debtor's rights in the property; it was not
intended to be "use[ d] as a sword" to carve out extreme remedies that may result from its
breach. See Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160. Requiring a debtor to show how he was
prejudiced by any alleged noncompliance with the Act ensures that the Act serves this
purpose for which it was enacted.

{37083362;1
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III.

The Adamsons Failed To Meet This High Burden Of Proof To Set Aside The
Sale.
When the correct test is applied, the Adamsons' failure to prove that the sale

should be set aside is indisputable. See Trial Tr. 22: 1-3 9: 19 (evidence presented by the
Adamsons); Trial Tr. 60:8-25 (Distressed Asset arguing that the heightened standard
applied). Specifically, they failed to present evidence that an "unjust extreme" would
result if ReconTrust were allowed to exercise the power of sale in lieu of a Utah attorney
or title insurance company. Nor did they present evidence that: (1) any interest was
sacrificed or that some attendant fraud or unfair dealing arose from having ReconTrust
serve as trustee; (2) they were denied the ability to cure the default or that they were
capable of curing the default, or (3) that ReconTrust's involvement affected the bidding
or the sale price of the property. Indeed, they have never even alleged that they could
meet this heightened standard of proof.

IV.

The Trial Court's Ruling Has Severe Consequences.
The trial court's holding that the foreclosure sale and resulting trustee's deed are

void is a drastic and extraordinary ruling that will have severe negative consequences for
citizens of Utah.
A void deed "cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity in
court." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,I 18 (footnote omitted). It also "carries no title on which a
bona fide purchaser may rely." Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK Corp., 571 P.2d 1339, 1341
(Utah 1977). Under the trial court's ruling, therefore, bona fide purchasers-whether an
entity like Distressed Asset or an individual owner who purchased a property-will lose

{37083362;1 }29

their interest in properties sold by a national bank even though the purchasers have
owned the property, made improvements on it, and have been paying property taxes and
insurance, in some cases for years.
Even more troubling than the impact on the initial bona fide purchaser's interest in
the property, subsequent bona fide purchasers will lose their interests as well. Consider
this scenario: A debtor defaults and voluntarily vacates the property after the trustee's
sale conducted by ReconTrust seven years ago, and a bona fide purchaser, the Smith

0

family, buys the property. The Smith family, having paid taxes on the property and
renovated the house, later sold the property to the Jones family, who also paid taxes on
the property. They then sold the property to the Williams family. If this hypothetical
property were subjected to a void ruling by this Court, a long line of bona fide purchasers
could have their interests undone.

This involuntary voiding of conveyances would

potentially lead to claims involving all three families concerning the warranties in the
deeds through which they transferred the property.
Declaring deeds void could raise other issues.

For instance, liens that were

extinguished by foreclosure sales would no longer be extinguished.

In other words,

thousands of property sales will be affected either directly or indirectly. Sorting through
the land records and determining who should have what interests in each property and
what monetary compensation may be owed from one person to another would require a
herculean effort-and an unnecessary one if the debtor who defaulted suffered no harm
from having a national bank rather than _a Utah attorney or title insurance company
exercise the power of sale.
{37083362;1}30
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At the same time, defaulted borrowers like Samuel Adamson will receive a
windfall merely by showing that a national bank executed certain foreclosure documents
instead of a Utah title insurance company or Utah attorney.

They will be able to

challenge the validity of sales, for the first time, months or even years after the sales
occurred and the property has been sold multiple times. They will be able to remain in
possession of the property even if they have failed to pay any taxes or insurance or other
~

value for the property since the foreclosure sale. And some defaulted borrowers may not
even want the sales undone-they may not want to live in the property, pay taxes on the
property, or insure the property. Though these borrowers may have desired to move on, a
ruling that ReconTrust's foreclosures are all void will not give these borrowers that
choice.
These consequences are not theoretical. Borrowers have already relied on the trial
court's ruling to seek eviction of Utah homeowners who purchased a foreclosed property
at a sale in which ReconTrust exercised the power of sale. See Add. at A-35 (Notice,
Zamacona v. Blake, Lis Pendens: WG-545-B-1 (Utah Dist. Ct. Feb. 3, 2015). 10 This

assault on the property rights of Utah citizens is inconsistent with the importance of
requiring finality in title to real property, see Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp., 1999 UT App 232,
110 (quoted supra p. 26), and is wholly inconsistent with the purpose of Utah Code§ 571-23-to provide debtors an opportunity to meet with trustees prior to foreclosure, see

10

This Court may take judicial notice of a filed lis pendens. See J.M W. v. TI.Z,
2011 UT 38, ,I 6 n.l, 266 P.3d 702 ..
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supra Part II.B.3. None of these consequences were specifically addressed in the trial
court's opinion, but they are real and merit this Court's consideration.
The trial court's decision holding that the sale is void is extraordinary because
there are no Utah appellate cases or statutes requiring or even supporting this drastic
remedy. That is undoubtedly because the sole statutory remedy for these sales allows
only limited monetary relief when a sale is conducted by a trustee who lacks authority to
exercise the power of sale. See supra Part II.B.3; Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'!

Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (explaining that when a statute sets
forth certain remedies, courts presume that no other remedy is available). Although Utah
Code § 57-1-23.5 does not have retroactive effect on the properties in this case, its
express remedies certainly provide a reasonable framework for a court-ordered remedy in
an analogous situation. The trial court's holding that a sale conducted before enactment
of this statute should be considered void is inconsistent with the limited monetary remedy
authorized by the current statute.

V.

The Adamsons Are Barred From Challenging The Validity Of The
Foreclosure Sale By The Doctrines Of Waiver And Estoppel.
Even if the Adamsons had attempted to meet the heightened burden set forth in

Concepts, which they did not, those defenses are waived. The A damsons failed to raise
timely arguments relating to ReconTrust's authority to exercise the power of sale. Under
Utah law, a debtor's interests are "protected ... up to the moment that the property [is]
sold and a trustee's deed issue[s]." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1161. During that time, if a
debtor seeks to challenge whether a sale complies
with the Utah Trust Deed Act's
,,,
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requirements, "the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a
debtor to challenge irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a
trustee's deed is executed and delivered to the purchaser." Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206,

,I 15.
Debtors who fail to exercise their remedies before a foreclosure sale occurs are
barred from later doing so under the doctrines of waiver and estoppel, except where an
irregularity or defect renders the sale "a complete legal nullity":
[A] mortgagor may by acquiescence and failure to assert his
rights at the proper time be estopped to set up irregularities in
the foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the purchaser.
Furthermore, the cardinal principle of estoppel, that one who
knowingly and silently permits another to expend money on
land, under a belief that he has title, will not be permitted to
set up his own right to the exclusion of the rights of the one
who made the improvements, finds application in a variety of
ways where land has been sold under invalid foreclosure
proceedings.
Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1989)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
In this case, ReconTrust executed and recorded a notice of default and election to
G)

sell that states that ReconTrust, as trustee, had elected to sell the property. See Trial Tr.
19: 12-15; Trial Ex. 1. The notice provided a phone number if the Adamsons had any
questions. See Trial Ex. 1. The Adamsons neither attempted to contact ReconTrust
before the sale regarding the validity of the sale, nor did they seek an injunction or file a
lawsuit prior to the sale to prevent it from occurring. See Trial Tr. 71: 12-18 (court
stating that the Adamsons "knew the sale, and they did nothing to stop it" and that the
{37083362; I }3 3

Adamsons "didn't file a lawsuit before the sale to try and stop the sale"); R. 412 (court
finding that "Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred.").
They offered no explanation for failing to challenge the sale before it occurred. See Trial
Tr. 29: 1-5 (Samuel Adamson testifying that he "never would have thought to call or
contact ReconTrust" regarding the notice of default and election to sell). Indeed, they
waited until almost a year after the sale was concluded to challenge its validity by filing a
putative class action, and they never filed a lis pendens against the property. See R. 415
n.9 (referring to the federal class action lawsuit that Samuel Adamson filed in November
2010); Trial Tr. 36:9-25. In other words, they knowingly failed to assert their rights until
several months after the sale occurred, without any reason, and therefore should have
been prohibited from challenging the sale at trial.

VI.

At Most, The Trustee's Deed Issued By ReconTrust Is Voidable.
If the Court determines that the trustee's deed in this case is invalid, the Court

need not go so far as declaring it void ab initio. Instead, the Court should treat the
trustee's deed as merely voidable. Cf Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Utah
1993) ("Under well-established law a number of cases have held 'void' to mean
'voidable' only."). A voidable deed is one that "offend[s] an individual, such as those
arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,r 19. A voidable
deed "may be ratified at the election of the injured party" and "[o]nee ratified, the
voidable ... deed is deemed valid." Id.

,r 18.

"[S]ilence with full knowledge of the facts

may ... operate as a ratification." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982)
(citation omitted).
{37083362;1
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The sale and resulting deed were ratified by the Adamsons when they failed to
timely object to the validity of the sale; therefore, the sale and deed should be deemed
valid. See supra Part III. Even if the Adamsons did not ratify the sale, the deed is
enforceable by Distressed Asset, a bona fide purchaser, because a voidable deed is
"unassailable in the hands of a [bona fide purchaser]." Broadbent v. Powers, No. CIV
2:05 CV 375, 2006 WL 2527429, at *3 (D. Utah Aug. 29, 2006) (unpublished) (quoting
~

Roger A. Cunningham et al., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 720 (West 1984)).
The trial court refused to rely on Ockey and its definitions of void and voidable
deeds, claiming that it involved a conveyance by a trustee after the termination of a trust
and "did not involve a trustee's foreclosure sale." R. 414 n.6. Ockey, however, is not
limited to the context of express trusts. Ockey' s discussion of void and voidable acts
relied on cases from other contexts, including Millard County School District, 14 P .2d at
971-72 (finding securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority were not
void) and Zion's Service Corp. v. Danielson, 366 P .2d 982, 985-86 (196 I) (finding void
a contract intended to control prices and limit competition between the bids given by
masonry contractors). See Ockey, 2008 UT 37,

,rcn 22-24. This rule applies to deeds like

the one in this case, and applying that rule makes clear that, at most, the sale here was
voidable.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing Distressed Asset's
unlawful-detainer action.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DISTRESSED ASSEX SOLUTIONS FUND
I, LLC,

DECISION AND ORDERDISlVIISSING
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 140500067
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON; COUR1NEY D.
ADAMSON; et al.,.

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Defendants.

This is an action for unlawful detainer, which came on for trial on August 7, 2014, after
which the court took the matter under advisement. The court now dismisses this action for the
reasons given below.
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5,
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty~of unlawful
detainer if the person:
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in d~sposition of the property by a
· trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and
(2) c-ontinues to occupy the property after ~e trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after

· being served with a notice to qll:it by the purchaser.
At trial, Plaintiff presented as· exhibits certified copies of the notice of default, the trust

000-402
A-11

deed, and its own quitclaim deed, thus making out a prima facie case under the statute. 1

In defense, however, Defendants raised ~e issue of whether subdivision (l)'s
requirement of ''disposition of the property by a trustee's sale" has been satisfied.2 ·There appears
to be no question that Defendants defaulted on their obligations under a note se.cured by a trust
deed, and that ReconTrust, acting as trustee, gave notice of default and intention to sell the
property, and ultimately conducted a.trustee's sale in January 2010, purporting to sell the
property to Plaintiff's predecessor in interest.
· Defendants argue that because the 2010 trustee's sale was conducted by ReconTnist, who
was not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23,
see Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist 2013 UT 45, ,r 13, 311 P.3d 1004 ("ReconTrilst is
neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a #tle insurance company or agency with an office in
the State of Utah. ReconTrust.was therefore not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under
Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23."); kl:.,~ 49 ("As a national bank operating in Utah

1

Plaintiff also agreed to file, after trial, a certified copy of the 2007 trust deed, but thus
far has not done so.
2

In addressing this defense, the court considers, in addition to the evidence and
argllIIlents presented at trial, the briefing submitted on Defendants' Motion for Declaratory
Judgment. At trial, the court· indicated that it would not grant such motion at that time because
there was nothing in Defendants' pleadings suggesting that they were seeking declaratory relief.
However, also as indicated at trial, the m_otion addresses the substance of Defendants~ defense, so
the court references such briefing as a matter of convenience. Plaintiffs opposition memorandum
filed May 23, 2014, is referenced herein as "Mem. Opp."
2

000403 ..
A-2

under the [National Banking Act], ReconTrust is precluded from exercising the power of a
trustee under Utah statute for purposes of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure."), the sale and
resulting trust deed are null and void ab initio.
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Sundquist court expressly declined to decide what effect,

_· G

if any, its determination that ReconTrust did not qualify as a trustee with the power of sale would

have on the validity of the sale and resulting trust deed. See llL, ,r 50 ("Our opinion-in this matter
is limited to the narrow issue of whether Utah law regarding the qualification of trustees is
preempted by the [National Banking Act]. In briefing and oral argument, the parties have
attempted to raise a variety of other issues relating to the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure

sale, the validity of the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of restitution. Because these
issues were not fully litigated below, we decline to reach them on interlocutory appeal.").

However, as Plaintiff also points out, the Court of Appeals has been presented with
arguments similar to those of Defendants, and has not even considered it necessary to reach the~
where the party attacking the validity of a trustee's sale failed to allege or prove how its rights
were affected by the defect complained of. For example, in RM Lifestyles, LLC

v. Ellison, 2011
r.·.,

'iiU

UT App 290, 263 P.3 d 1152, the defendants in an unlawful detainer action "argued that the trust
deed ~ale was void because [the trustee] recorded the notice of default before it had been
substituted as trustee, that the statute did not allow [the beneficiary] to ratify [the 1:ru:Stee's]
action, and that the execution of the substitution of trustee violated the statute of frauds." ML, 1

3

000404
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15. · On review, the Court of Appeals declined to "reach the merits of these issues because the·
[defendants], in attacking the trust deed sale's validity after the sale, ha[d] not met their burden
of proving that the alleged irregularity affected their rights," id. (footnote omitted), and "[did] not
claim that they were denied the right to cure the default or ever planned on or were capable

of

curing the default.'' Id., 118 (citation omitted).

Similarly, in Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 285 P.3d 7, the plaintiff argue_d
"that the trustee's sale [was] void" because the individual who "recorded the notice of default and
held the trustee's sale" did so "before [the beneficiaryJ executed and recorded a written
substitution of trustee." ML ~ 13. The plaintiff also, challenged the beneficiary's later "attempt ·to
ratify [this individual's] actions after the trustee sale." Id. In other words, like Defe11:dants here,
the· plaintiff attacked the validity of the sale based on the questionable authority of the one who
conducted it. Again, the Court of Appeals declined fo decide these issues on their merits based on

the fact that, "in attacking the validity of the trustee's sale, [the plaintiff] ha[d] not alleged that
the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights." Id.
In contrast to RM Lifestyle~ and Reynolds are two cases cited by Defendants. First,. in an

early Utah Supreme Court case, the court ?eld a trust sale void where it was not performed _by the
person authorized under the deed of trust:
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States Marshal.
1bis was nbf cicme. One of his deputies made the sale as auctioneer. It is not
claimed th~t he acted as deputy, but simply that a person who was a deputy acted
4

000~05
A-4

c!-5 the auctioneer. Nor do we think that the marshal could hav~ acted by deputy,
unless the deed of trust had shown express authority to that effect, which it did not
do. The fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the
question. Nor is it affected by the fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party.
The sale was made by one not authorized to make it, and cannot be uphe-Id. It is
simply void, and no one gains any rights under it. A purchaser must know that the
sale is made by the proper person. The deed of trust shows who could make the
sale. A trustee
no doubt employ .an auctioneer to act for him in crying off the
property; but the trustee must be present ai:id superintend the sale. The trustee in
the present instance says that he does not think he was present at the sale.

can

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880) (emphasis added).
More recently, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a nonjudicial

foreclosure sale for delinquent assessments owed to a condominium association was void where
the sale was conducted by the association's attorney because "[t]he record reveal[ed] that, though
its attorney may have qualified as a trustee under the Trust Deed Act, the Association failed to
1

appoint its attorney as such." McOueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass n. Inc., 2013
UT App 53, 11 19-21 & 28, 298 P.3d 666.

Notably, the McQueen cqurt does not discuss the obstacles to setting aside a trustee sale
that were mentioned, and indeed dispositive, in the RM Lifestyles and Reynolds case_s, as
summarized above. Rather, the court simply addressed the claimed defect - the absence of the
statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on its merits, and agreed that it ren~ered the sale
void. Reconciliation of these cases is difficult.
Reconciliation

of Singer with RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also difficult. To say, as do
5

000~06
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these later cases, that a party attacking the validity of a trustee sale must allege that the claimed
defect result~d in an injury to "the interests of the debtor," or "some attendant fraud or unfair
dealing," RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16, or a circumstance "reach[ing] unjust
extremes," id.; Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206,, 15, is plainly at odds with Singer's statement that,
i;;f) ·

where an unauthorized person conducts the sale, "[t]he fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has
been shown, does not affect the question." 2 Utah at 54 7.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Singer on the ground that the deed of trust in that case
specified who could conduct the sale, and that there is no such provision in the trust deed here.
Plaintiff also notes that Singer was decided well before the current governing statutes, and
criticizes Defendants for not providing any additional authority to support their argument that the
sale here is void.
Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in Utah Code sections 57-121 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a trustee's sale are clearly comparable to

the trust deed provision identifying who was authorized to conduct the sale in Singer, particularly
since "a contract," such as the trust deed here, "implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it
was entered."3 Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Shexwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct

3

It is unnecessary to decide which law to apply here (i.e., the law in effect in August

2007' when the trust. deed was executed, or the law in effect in January. 2010, when the trust sale

occurred) since the statutory provisions defining a qualified trustee did not change between these
periods.
6
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,,-

App. 1990) (citing, among other cases, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53,
60 (Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595,601, 24 L.Ed. 793 (1878) (holding that
contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement)));
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) ("The power to sell under
r::·;

deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between [the] mortgagor and mortgagee under the terms

~

and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It cannot be enlarged beyond the terms
of the contract and the incorporated relevant statutes.") (emphasis added and footnotes.omitted).
Thus, this attempted distinction fails.
Second, while Singer is an older case, it is consistent with prevailing law on the subject
today, as well as with current Utah statutory law. As· a leading treatise on ~eal estate financing
explains:
Generally, defects in the exercise of a power of sale can be categorized in at least
three ways - void, voidable, or inconsequential.
Some defects are so substantial that they render the sale void. In this situation,
neither legal nor equitable title transfers to the sale purchaser or subsequent
grantees, except perhaps by adverse possession .... A sale ... is void when
someone other than the named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor
who has not been validly appoin~ed, or, conversely, if the original trustee conducts
the sale after a successor-trustee has been appointed.
Most defects render the foreclosure voidable and not void. When a voidable error
occurs, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser, subject to the redemption
rights of those injured by the defective foreclosure. Typically, a voidable error is
"an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale" and must be "substantial or
result in a probable unfairness." ... If the defect only renders the sale voidable,

7
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the redemption rights can be cut off if a bona· fide purchaser for value acquires the
land. When this occurs, an action for damages against the foreclosing mortgagee
or trustee may be the only remaining remedy.
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential that they render the sale neither ~oid
nor voidable. These defects commonly involve minor discrepancies in the notice
of sale....
Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitm.an et al, Real Estate Finance Law§ 7:21 at 953-957 (6th ed.
2014) (hereinafter Nelson & Whitman) (underscoring added and footnotes omitted; italics in
original).
Viewed within this framework, Singer clearly talces its place in the first category, and the
prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are seen to be
applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering a sale voidable rather than

void. This is consistent with Singer, which expressly disavows any such prerequisites as to a sale
conducted by one not authorized to do so. It is also consistent with McOueen, ~hich affirmed
.that a sale was void based only on the fact that the person who conducted it had not been
appointed as a trustee as statutorily required.
The limited applicability of the prerequisites stated in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also
shown by examination of the cases cited therein. For instance, bot4 cases quote the statement
made in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1987) (per
curiam}, that "[a] sale once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were
sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing." 2011 UT App 290, 116; 2012
8
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UT App 206, ,I 14. Concepts involved the attempted invalidation of a sale based on the fact that

the notice of sale, which was printed in 1983, incorrectly stated that the sale was to be conducted
on a given date in 1982, see 743 P.2d at 1159-a defect that the court ultimately characterized as
a "minor typographical error." Id. at 1161. Thus, the statement quoted is clearly taken from a case

falling into the third category described above (one involving "minor discrep.ancies in the notice
of sale"), not one involving what Singer held to be a fundamental error. 4

Similarly, RM Lifeszyles and Reynolds each state that a trustee's sale should be set aside
"only in cases which reach unjust extremes." 201 I UT App 290, ~ 16; 2012 UT App 206; ,i 15.

For this proposition, RM Lifestyles cites Thomas v. Johns.on, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), which in tum cited Concepts, see Mh, and which involved only a challenge to the manner

.- in which the sale was conducted - namely, the trustee's acceptanc~ of a bid offering to pay "fair
market value" (rather than a specific dollar amount) for the property. The court rejected this
challenge, holding that the statute ~as satisfied by the bid and "find[ing] no evidence that [the

4

Significantly, Concepts actually reiterates the underlying principle from Singer
(although with a different focus in mind-namely, the party intended to benefit from statutory
notice requirements), that "[t]he maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may condition the
exercis.e of the power upon such conditions as he may describe." 743 P.2ci at 1160 (citing
Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983)) (emphasis
omitted). The cited case elaborates, as noted in Concepts, saying that "[t]he grantor of the power
[of sale] is entitled to have his directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have
it to talce place at the. time and place, and by the person appointed by him." 650 S. W.2d at 768
(emphasis added and citation omitted).
9
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debtor's] interests were sacrificed· by the trustee's action .... " Id. at 189. 5 RM Lifestyle·s and
Reynolds also cite Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ~~ 36-37, 86 P.3d 699, which ~gain merely
reiterated the holding of Concepts, and which, like Concepts, involved - as pertinent ~ere - only
a challenge to the sufficiency of the notice of the sale given to the debtor. Id.
Thus, none of the cases cited to support the prerequisites identified in RM Lifestyles and
Reynolds involved "a purported sale by an unautho!ized person," which is to be distinguished
from cases in which there is merely "a question of procequral irregularities in a trustee's sale."
Citizens Bank of Edina v. W. Quincy Auto Auction, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1987) (en
bane). Where, as here (and as in Singer), there is "a completely unauthorized sale conducted by
an individual who was powerless to' sell the property,"

it is irrelevant "[w]hether.in point of fact,

the sale of the property was conducted in all respects judiciously or not, or in a manner most
conducive to the interests of those concerned," although "[t]his would be a legitimate inquiry in a
proceeding to set aside a sale ~ade under the power conferred by the instrument. .... " Id.
(citation omitted). Thi~ conclusion is inconsistent with Reynolds. but that case must yield to
Singer based on the principle that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply cannot overrule the law as

5

Thomas also included a footnote summarily rejecting the debtor's additional challenge
in that case to the trustee's acceptance of a credit bid rather than "requir[ing] the bid to be
'payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale,' as allegedly instructed in the
trust deed"-· a provision that. if it existed. the court held to be satisfied by the credit bid. See 801
P.2d at 188 n.1.

·
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announced by the highest court in the state, even if the announcement was made decades ago.',
Sentry Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Plaintiff also relies on the holding in Reynolds that, "[a]bsent such exceptional
circumstances [i.e., hann to the interests of the debtor, fraud, unfair dealing,

or unjust extremes],

the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge
irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is exe~uted
and delivered to the purchaser." 2012 UT App 206, ~ 15 (citing RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App
290, , 15 n.4 (internal citation omitted)) (emphasi~ added). Because, as just discussed,
Reynolds's requirerp.ent of harm, etc. as a prerequisite to setting aside a trustee's sale must be
limited (under Singer) to those cases involving defects rendering a ~ale voidable rather than void,
the companion requirement that challenges to irregularities be raised via a pre-sale injunction
proceeding, except where hann, etc~, is shown, must likev,ise be so limited. To hold otherwise.
would be to say that a debtor need not attempt to obtain a pre-sale injunction in a case in which

the sale is only voidable (because it may be set aside thereafter by a showing of harm, etc.), but
that such an attempt must be made where the sale is utterly void.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that ~'the cloctrines of waiver and estoppel bar Defendants'
claim that the Foreclosure Sale is void and should be set aside.'' ~e~. Opp. at 9. To support this
argument, Plaintiff observes that
Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred. It is
11
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undisputed that the Foreclpsure Sale took place fa January 20 I 0. It is also
undisputed that although the Defendants in this case filed a class-action suit in
federal court in November 2010, they have not prosecuted their claims .in the
Federal Action since the ruling in Garrett in September 2013, which ruled that a
foreclosure sale done in Utah by ReconTrust was valid. It is undisputed that
Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside the Foreclosure Sale in the Prior State
Case in July 2010, but failed to prosecute this claim, and allow~d the case to be
dismissed on June 21, 2012. Importantly, although the Defendants in this case
were, or are, parties in the Prior·state Action and Federal Action respectively, they
failed to ever record a lis pendens on the Property. It is also undisputed that
Defendants have failed to pay any value; and have failed to pay property taxes, for
the Property since June 2009. Like the mortgagor in American Falls Canal
Securities Co., the Defendants in this case have failed to properly and timely
assert their rights to defeat the rights of Plaintiff, an innocent bona fide purchaser.
Defendants have knowingly and silently sat on any alleged rights they have to the
Property, and most importantly, have allowed Plaintiff to expend money
purchasing the Property. Defendants do not claim they had the ability to cure the
default and stop the Foreclosure Sale. Defendants did not challenge the sale before
it occurred, and therefore, the Trustee's Deed from ReconTrust must remain
valid. [FN] I
[FN] 1 Even· if the court'considered a trustee's deed voidable, "[a] voidable deed ..
. 'is unassailable in the hands o'f a [bona fide purchaser]."' See SEC v. Madison
Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Utah 2009) (citation
omitted).

Mem. Opp. at 9~10.

In the American Falls case cited, the Supreme Court recognized that "a party otherwise in
position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded fr~m doing so based
upon conduct sufficient to bring into operation ¢.e doctrines of waiver and estoppel." Am. Falls
Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412, ~14 (Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted).
The court indicated; however, that a party may not W?J.i:V~ the right to challenge, or be estopped
12
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from ch~lenging, a sale wh~llY: void, see· id. ("[E]xcept where no~-compliance results in a ·
complete legal nullity, one otherwise entitled to object to a judicial sale in mortgage foreclosure
proceedings as involving a defect or irregularity ·based upon a lack of or insufficient process,
notice, advertisement or other designation with respect to the sale, designed for his benefit and
protection, may waive, or be estopped from asserting, such defect or irregularity.") (emphasis

Q

added and citation omitted); see also Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ~ 22, 189 P.3d 51, 57
(distinguishing "' ... between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires,' which could
become enforceable by ratification or estoppel") (quoting Millard Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank
of Millard Cnty., 80 Utah 170, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 (1932)), which, under Singer, is what results
from a trustee's sale conducted by one not having authority. 6
Moreover, eyen where it has been said that " [a] want of authority in the trustee making
the sale may be waived by the parties in interest, or they may estop themselves by their conduct
to object to such want of authority, at least as against the purchaser at the sale," ?9 C.J.S.
Mortg~ges § 764 (WestlawNext databas~ updated June 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Kroff, 144 Mo.
433, 46 S. W. 424 (1898); Spencer v. Hawkins, 39 N.C. 288, 4 Ired. Eq. 288, 1846 WL 1113

6

Plaintiff relies on Ockey, which held that a conveyance effected by trustees after the
termination of the trust "was merely voidable" rather than void, see 2008 UT 37,, 24, and on
Millard County, which held that securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority
were likewise only voidable, see Mt, 122, but these cases did not involve a trustee's foreclosure
sale, in which context the clear rule is shown by Singer and the other authorities discussed above.
13
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(1846); Schwarz v. Kellogg, 243 S. W. 179 (rv.[o. 1922)), the conduct giving rise to the waiver or
estoppel in the cited· c~es was considerably more affirmative than anything Defendants are
·alleged to have done here.
Certainly, Defendants' failure to pay taxes or any other value for the property since June

2009, 7 while remaining in possession, is understandably frustrating for the foreclosure sale
purchaser (or its successor in interest), but it is not inconsistent with their claim that the sale is
void, 8 nor can their failure to affirmatively pursue judicial vindication of their position during
this period properly be so characterized. 9 Cf. Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn~ 259,261,256

7

At trial, Mr. Adamson actually acknowledged not having made payments since
December 2008, explaining that, since April 2010, their lender refused to accept any payments.
8

Indeed, under the circumstances, it would be the making of payments to the purchaser at
the sale, or to its successor in interest, that would be would be inconsistent with Defendants'
claim.
9

•

Defendants' federal class-action lawsuit (initiated in November 2010), was stayed
pending the outcome of Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 546 F. App 1x 736 (10th Cir. 2013)
(which, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, did not.unqualifiedly hold "that ReconTrust had the
authority to act as a trustee in Utah, and therefore, the foreclosure saie that took place in the
Garrett case was valid," Mem. Opp. at 3), and appears to remain pending. Resolution of the
''Prior State Case" (case number 100501437 in this court) is difficult to follow. This w~s an
unlawful detainer action filed·against Defendants by Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, and
appears to have been dismissed due to the failure of both sides to appear at a hearing on or about
June 19, 2012: (The Order of Dismissal is a minute entry for a hearing that appears to have been
held on June 19, 2012 (the date of the caption), but the signature line on the order is dated June
·20, 2012, which is also the file stamp date, and the order was filed in CORIS on June 21, 2012.)
However, the parties in the case hac;i previously stipulated to continue the scheduled trial
"without date,,, an order to that effect was entered on November 17, 2011, and no prior notice of
any hearing scheduled thereafter appears in CORIS.

14
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and Whitman went as far as to assert that "the conclusive impact" of such statutes should be
limited "to procedural defects in the foreclosure process,'' consistent with the likely legislative
intent. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosur~:_The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1506-1507 (2004).
Although this suggested bright-line limitation did not find its way into the most recent
version of Nelson and Whitman's treatise, it appears to accurately reflect how these "conclusive''
statutory pre~umptions should be understood. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. &
Dev. Coro., 154 Ariz. 256~ 260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (observing, with ·
reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to that of Utah, and without
apparent disagreement, that "[w]hen the California cases hold that recitals in a deed of trust are
conclusive, they qualify that they ·are conclusive 'in the absence of grounds for equitable relief, rn
but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a case where there was no "fraud, misrepresentation,
... concealment," bad faith, or breach of fiduciary duty) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
Among the traditional grounds for equitable relfef not specifically mentioned in Main I is, as
previously indicated, the absence of a power of sale in the party conducting such sale. See 5

•.

Tiffany Real Prop. § 1550 (3d ed.) (WestlawNext database updated September 2013) ("It appears
that _the sale will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been
previously enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or
was conducted by a party without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was ~ubstantially
17
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Plaintiff also argues that the statutory remedy set forth iri Utah Code section 57-1-23.5 is
exclusive, but this section was not added until 2011, the year after the sale at issue here, and
. Plaintiff has made no argument to show its retroactive applicability.
Finally, Plaintiff stresses that it is a boria fide purchaser for value. Assuming that to be
true, 10 ho'Yever, -Singer clearly holds that such status cannot validate a void sale. This
determinatidn is not altered by Utah Code section 57-1 ~28 1s provision stating that trust deed
"recitals ofcompliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the
exercise of the power of sale and sale _of the property described in the trustee's deed" "are
conclusive evidence in favor of bona :fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without
notice.'_' Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii).
For obvious reasons, such provisions cannot be taken completely at face value. See
Nelson & Whitman§ 7.22 at 982 (describing "[t]he literal language ofthls ... type of statute" as

"breathtakingly broad in its impact on BFPs" as it "arguably applies even when the mortgagee
had no substantive right to foreclose," such as where "a lender forecloses though the secured
obligation is not in default or if the mortgage is forged" - a result that would be '.'fundamentally
unfair and is probably legislatively unintended"). In an earlier treatment of the subject, Nelson

10

Such an assumption may be unduly generous, given that Defendants have remained in
possession of the property challenging the validity of the sale at all times since the sale, thereby
giving notice to Plaintiff, prior to Plaintiffs purchase, of the claimed defect in the exercise of the
power of sale.
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and Whitman went as far as to assert that "the conclusive impact" of such statutes should be
'.

limited "to procedural defects in the foreclosure processt consistent with the likely legislative
intent. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosur~:. The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1506-1507 (2004).
Although this suggested bright-line limitation did not find its way into the most recent
version of Nelson and Whitman's treatise, it appears to accurately reflect how these "conclusive''
statutory pre~umptions should be understood. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. &
Dev. Coro., 154 Ariz. 256,. 260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (observing, with ·
reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to that of Utah, and without
apparent disagreement, that "[w ]hen the California cases hold that recitals in a deed of trust are
conclusive, they qualify that they ·are conclusive 'in the absence of grounds for equitable relief,"'

but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a case where there was no ''fraud, misrepresentation,
... concealment," bad faith, or breach of fiduciary duty) (emphasi~ added and citation omitted).
Among the traditional grounds for equitable relfef not specific.ally mentioned in Main I is, as
previously indicated, the absence of a power of sale in the party conducting such sale. See 5

Tiffany Real Prop. § 1550 (3d ed.) (WestlawNext database updated September 2013) ("It appears
that _the sale will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been

previously enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or
was conducted by a party without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was ~ubstantially
17
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defective.") (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Thus, the court concludes that the
··protection afforded to BFPs by Utah Code section 57-1-28 is not intended to extend, and does
not extend, to protect aga~nst defects traditionally viewed as fundamental, such as the one at issue
here.
For these reasons, the court holds that Plaintiff has not overcome Defendants' defense
that there has been no "disposition of the property by a trustee's sale," as required under Utah

Code section 78B-6-802.5, and accordingly dismisses this unlawful detainer action.
ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, AD!(JDGED, and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' wtlawful detainer action is dismissed.
Dated this

Q.I\JJ.- day of September, 2014.
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The Escrow Funds are:-pledged as aclditjonal sec.:.m.iy for all $~,se~d ·t,y thi.s .S~tirlo/ :1n$UJn,ent. ):f.
'Borrower tenders to Lender the.full pay.mdlt ofoilLstich: sums~: :Boirower'$ a.QOCJWl~ shall be credited 1yjth the ~aliu)ce
:;reI,IlallllDg_ for. al) inst~ti, .item.s.(~). (b), -~ .{c)' i!nd aey mortgage ~urance premimn fus!a]linenfthat Lender 'Jias:nat becqm~ a1iligated to pay to· ~ SepretarJ,;' ~ :;r.;e~der, sb.a!i. pz:oµrptly :refund any· excess funds to Borrower.
Iimnediatel_y prior 1o a foreclosure sal~ .of the PJ'.OperlY or ~ acqtft~~()Jl. '.by U~der.. ·BP110wers accti4nt shllli- ~
credited mtb..any balahce·remainirtg.fota1lmstallnien1s for :i1ems"(a),. (b), ~d'(~).
3. Appli~ti~n:.clfPaym~(s; Alfpay.Qi~ in,iiler'.Pat~Elphs i and 2 shall be applied by Lenueras foUpws:
Fli-st to. the ~ortgage ins~ce p~mium to·.b,e paid: J;Y Lenger tc;, -~¢ ::!~cfetaiy or lo tlie :monthly ;charge ·by
the Secretary 'instead .ofthe riionthly mortgage insurance premium;
. .
~ to $.Y,' ta:xes; ·speci~. asse$e~ts, iea.seho1ci payments. or ground rents, and .fire:,. flppd -and other
h~arcl ii)sui'~e p;re.tni_um.s,. as :\"tqwre4j
third. ,fo interestdQcHlnder tbi,Note;
~ ,fo amtlftii.atlon of the prlnci_p'al ofthe Note; and
Fiftfi..,tgJ,~e c;h,arge~ d1'~ $.9~ fl¢ N.o~~.
4. .Fir,c; F,Jooil and :Other' Hazard Insura..,~e. ~µ;r.row;r sh.all '.fu.sqre al~ imw.PWW~.Jlts oii the Pro~,·
whether now in e.xistence·or subseguently erected,. agai.nst·any•harards, casualtie~, and. conJh.Jgen¢if?SJ:mclQqirig_fire~ for
whii:Jt V~~ requ~ 1µsu,raµce~ ·tws insu.rance. shall be maintained in ~ amounts and. far the ~rlod~ fu~ Le,!ld~r
J:etIUir.es, »~r,rower_ sllall ·cµso insµre- ~ ~prQwmeAf~ ~ri, ~ Pro.perly•. whether .now in tPd·sten~. or :$nbsegrtenily
etePte~ i!gafust Joss by floods: to the e*nt·reqJJi@d by i:Jie ,Secre~. ~ n:i~ce s.}iail ·oe ~ed wit~: companies:
approved by Lender. The msttranc,;i policies and .aizy rene.wals $ball·be h.eld ~ ~nder aµl:1 ~h~ inclµde :IQss payal11e·
c1at1~s-i~t~YW 9(: and 1:D. af.omi ~eptable to, Lender~
In~ eve,nt9fioss. Bon'o~¢i ~;lll give·4.m.ier·•ei;liatonotice by mail. I..ende:r.may;m~ yroofofloss if
not ·m.ade 'promptly by'Bom~w.er: .~c}l jnsµranc!;' company· CQnceyiied ·is hei:eby authorized and directed to. roaire
payment fcir.sucb: loss dir~tly Jo tender, instead ofto Borrower and. toLe~clerjo~tJy~ AU-or any·part ·of~ msµrance
proceeds,may be applied by Lender, aHts tip1ion,. either (aJto 1he.reductiort: ofihe' indebtt;d1;1e~s under $e Note:~d this
:$.~~-. Jns-e.rit; ·"QI"St lo any d~queilt ~ou:nm apP.lie<f in the order of '.Paragrap~· 3~ and tlllfil to ·prepaY,111ent- of
principalj o.r:@) t<1 t;be~tora1ion. or.re.pair ofth~.damaged property. NJY appli~ati~ ofthe proceeds.to the:prlncq,al
·shall not .extend or posipane the due da.re ofthe monthly paymeAts wl)ich m-e.refeJre.d tofu Paragta:ph 2,. or c~.mge tJie
amoqnt of sµcb ~ayµie~:ts~ Aw. eXces~:i~urance pr~s over an amount required to pay: ell oufsfancling indebte~~$.
underthe·Nqte ~ 'this $.ec1;1µ,fy Inst;r.uni~nt .s1i:a1L~ p~d:to ~ e:mi.171¢galil' :entitled ~to.
fu•fu.e ewnt of foreclosure ofthi$ ~:uri.ty Ihstni01ent or 9tbe.r
o.ftitleto the Property .thatexlinc,cruishes.
the .qid~bt~es$, allrlght1 title. and intei:-esfofBorrowerin: and to insurance._poijcjes inf9rce,$all pass to the pu,rc:fi~,
5, Q¢cupancy• Pt~ervaJi;<~n,. M~~n~n~. ~nq ):'Toteetfon of' the. PtoP'erfy~, ~rrowe.r!s Loan
Application; 'Leasel1olds.. Borrower shall ~c'¥Y,· ~sfabl;isl4 and u;;~ ~ Pm.P¢Y l!;S· Bon:ower's pii:ncipal ·residen~e
·)Yi~ shay days after 'the:execution of thfa Secui:ity insh-wnent (or vruhin $4y i:l~ of.a. late:r $..l¢ Qi" iransfei- _of tb,e
:PJ'Q,Peey) .~d sii~w~tlnµe to ,<><::l?UP:ttµ_e~.¢.rtt·~ Bottower's,p:iincipal.resi~e.nre for llt least:oneyew ~-the date
o( occupancyi: :µiµess .L~n~er ~e~~ '1£i~t ,reqwn,me.Qt will cause undue hardship for• Bam:iwex; or :uriiess
extenuating ·cm:umstances ~which me beyond Boirow~ cqntr,oJ.. ~orrawer.:~h~l n<>tify L,ender:of any.ex:t.enuatfug
ci(clijllstances. Berro:wer shall not.commit waste or dbstroy .damage o.r S1.lbstan~y chang~ thfProperty: Qt a11ow-1he
l'rop~.rty to 4~tenora~~1 :re~9~a~l~ ~~*·$.cf '.leaf·expected. Lender may insplitthe Property Jf'th.e Pr6perfy is vacant or
abandoned or the loan: is jn ,d.efault Len~er mey take @.!Sonable action to protect and preserve. .such vacant. or
abarid.oned'P.ropelfy. Borrower shall also 'b.e in de.fault i,f'BOJ;f,ower,-durlng tiu., fo~~ppli~'(iojl proc~ss;_ giive mate~]y
false or :Q,Utccurate.Efoiniatlon: or-statements io'Lender.(ar failed fo flro~d~T.e~~ with ~Ji]ate!1!ll ~?n<>it)'fn:
~onnecdon mtb. the l~!Ui el'i°QeDc~~ ·1,y :the. ifote,. inc1uq~g, 1;,ut not limifucl t~~ tepr~sentationi;· C.O.Q.r;:,mring_".aprrow;r'~
occu,pancyof tA~. J>rpp.efo/. as a.Ptw.~ipitl ..residence. If tltis Se9'1rity lnstrujjleni is on 1easeho~d; Eorrow~ 'Shall comp1y.
with the pto:visions of the lease. IfBili:rower acg_u~s fee. .title to the'Ptopei:tY, "P.ie le_a,sehgl~ ~c,t fee titl~ ~ n,~t be
:iAe,rged tiµle~ Lend.e.fagreesto :the.merger hnvntfug.
·
·
6~ °CQJ1de~11?-ti~~ 'J;'he ptQce~gs·,pf',aizy -a\y!fi=a ofclaim.for damages► direct or conse.quenri~ in e;o.rmection
with any, ,90ll®]Jll)iJ.tio~ .or .oth~r ,taking ~f ~y ;Pait of the.l'r(jp~rcy; ;of for conveyance in _pl~e of CQndemnatiort, at~
herehy- a$Slgnr;,4 ancl ~hall b.e pidd to Lend~ to. th~ ,~xtfm! Qf th~:iWl :~ount ofjhe iiidebfedness th~h.eiliains unpaid
llliaciI..the· Note· antLthis .Securi~ Instrument Lendex: sh.a1l a.PPly sµch Jll'.'Weed~ t~ the req\lctf~ •of the ~~ep_rechiess

•f~
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~er the:.Note and this S~tuity -~ent, "first ~o any de~quent a,µounfs appli~ iii_ the o~eqtrovideil in Par~pn

th~*

3~ 'and
to prep~ym~.µt qfP~P~ _Aljy applicatirm.of.th~ proc~_eds to-th~ i>p,ticipiil ~l).lot ~xt$d.wpQSfpone
:t:Qe gue g~te of the.niorithly-payment.s,- :wlµch are ref~4 fo. mP.aragraph,2, ·9r qhange ffie-·tm101:1nt of such :payments•
..f'i,ny-excess·_pro~~s _over ·an amount reqllfre(l tc, p~y :al{ outstanding "incle~ess -llllder the :Not~ an4 -arls· Security
-Jn.stmmept shalJ bep_aidio the entity legally entitled thereto;

1;. Charges to _:lJor.rower and. Protection: ofLe~uiers ;Rigqts iii" tJie.l'ropeJV. Borrow.er shaJJ ·pay i1IJ
goyem.µ1~nM 91 m~~lpai - ~ - tipes· ~d impq~ti,ons th~t are.:not-fucNd~~ in Pan,igi'aph 2. ~o.r;row:ei shall _p~y
·these- pJ;ijgations 011: tim~· cl~ctly to the e.ntiiy which js ·pwed. 1he payment, If fail~ t~ :P.ey WQnld adv~sely affect

~-

Lenders mterestitr-fhe ..l>roperty, upon Le.nder's request Bo.trowel'"..sliali promptly fur:riisb to tender feceipts evi'ae:ncmg_
thes~ pay1ffei)ts.
IfBorr~ fiuls, f9-~ .ili.es~ payments m: tlie. paym~ ~quir¢<l ·'kj, PiUag1¥.h Z: or f~ to: perfol__Dl any
other .coveruu:its ~cl ,~ements contained in: this.· Security ~ent, or tlm.re is a JegJ!l proceeding that· may·
sigriilicaotl_y affect Lenders rights in the Property (such as a. _proceeding in bankruptcy,.for .conde;mnation or to enforce
Jaws ~-re~affons), then Lender may :do and pay, wh~ver is: necessary .to pro,tec~ ine value_ or -~~ '.Property iµ1d
l;entjer'~ tj.ghts iti.:the;E>rop¢y~.includiµg payment of taxes, b ~ ~ - ati~ e1tfiet ~~rn;ienti~ed in Panwap.h2 .
.Any amounts disbursed_ by Len4~ ;"Qnqer this Paragrapb. she]{ ~ e ~ :acfqiti()Jlf!] d~t pf Borrqwer and be
secured by .this Security Instrument These amounts shalLbeai :interest-from the daf.e of cli.sbUJ$emenf, at. the. Note rate,
and at the option of Lender,._ sbal1 be ~~iltely'_ ~ue a:rul_pliyable~ · .
.

. . . Bom,~er shall promptly 4isc~ any li~n.whic:h):ias prjolity over~ltlt~.¢~zy. ~~llt~~ 1:lo~wer:

(a)-_agµ'les Al wrliµig-,t:Q the1~a~eijt pftne:ql>li~tion.~med _by '.th~ Hen in a, mannerac~pt~Je. tot.ender; (b).confe~
in g9od faith the lienby, or defends· a_gainst'eiuorceme.nt of the lien in, l~gal pr«.eedin~ wl}icn in the umder's opinion
operate:to preventilie. ~nt:"orce.ment oftheJie.n; oi (c) secures fro~ ihe holder-of1he lien an agreement sat.isiactcuy to
L~n.der ~u"<>.llfinatiilg_tne li~n: to this ~¢cnrlty In~mifuent- Jf LencJer d~ter.lnme$ 14~ any part .oftl;e ~r<;>perty i_s subject
to· a lien w.hjch .IlUo/ att:aln priority. oy~ .tlµs Se~µri~ Instrnm:ent, Lender may gfye Bprrow~--~ n.otice ·iden1:ifying· the
lien. Borrower shall satisfy the lien ot take one .or more of the actions set forth:above within Jo· days. of the givmg of

.notice.

8~ Fees. Lender may collect _fees aJ)d _charges al}(hori~ by ~ S~~tmy.
9. Grounddor.-AcceJeratfon:ofDebt

(a) De.fault. Lender may, except as limited by regulations issued by tQe Secretmy· in the-case of payment
defaults, require· immediate payment m·full of~.sums ~cured by tins Secnrity-Instrumentif. .
(i} Sdr.i:l>~~r ~~fanit,s by fi!lling 10 pay fu fuII any ~onthly payment rajwred by tid~
·
~ecarity lnstr.ument_prior to' Qr pnJbe d~ .da~ o.fthe ne~ monthly payinerit~ 9r
(ii) Bom~Wer defaults bY, failing, for a period of Um:ty· d~A to perfonn any .other

.ob~igatlo:os ~il(~mthl~S~cQrity ~ i l ~

.

.

.

.

.

.

(b) Sale·Wit~q-ut C,r~~~ .4ppr~v.al. l,~der·sha)~ ifpermitted .by applicable law (iiwluding ~ction Hl(d)
ofthe G~•St Gemiafu:De_pository IristitutiQns,Acrofl9.82i 12 u.s.c~.§: 17.0lj-3(d)) and.with ~(tprlcir approval-of-qte
Sectetazy, require imniediate-paymeilt"fu fulfof all the ·stuns :secure.d by this.Secµrity Instrument if;
·
(i,) Al1 or part of-the Ptoperty;. or: a :l>e.tieficial inretest in a trust owning• all or·part of the
Property, is soJd or othenvise·ti:an.sferfed (9ther tni$ by devise or descent),? and
(il) J'he Property is '.]J.Ot :0ecupi~- 1;iy ~ ffi.ir.c~¢t O{ gr~e ~s hl~ or' hei prh,icipal .
residence; or tlte pwchaser or-grantee. do~ ~o occupy :th~ .Property, -but µls ·9r lier ~tlit h~ nof ~.Q. ·

-approved in acc<5tdante with the.t.equtreroe.ilts ·oft.liti Secretmy.

:'(~J N~rW~iver. If circumstanc~s o~~ur th!:lt wowi:f-~it Len~r to, require immediate payment in mu, l>;ut
Lender doe~ not·req1.µre su~h·pay,ments, Len.aer.do~ 11ot waive:its rights ·with respect to subsequeAfoi7~nts.
(d) geguiations .~f HUD Secrebu:r: In many ~llmStances ~gulaµ~nsi~ued. by"the.S~will limit
lender's .tjghfs. fu ihe-ease.of payment defaults; to requife·nnmediate pzy.ment in .full and foreclose if-not paid. This·
Security Instrµmelit'cfoes not authoriz.e acceleratfon at fb.reclqsute ifnot petmi«ed byi'egu]atlon~ of~e Sbcretruy.
.
( e) ,Mortgage Not bis~. Bori'ovrer agre~s. that if1his ~ecurlty fustj:rim,lfut mid. the No~ .?J'e npf ~~~ed
to be eligi"ble for insurance lUlder 1he National Housing Act w.ithin-6.0 day~ from the <late here9f,· Lender may~ ~- its
option require immediate. payment m.full ohill sums secured by tlrls Security In~trun:i~nJ. A "Wlltten s;tatemenf of'any
aDthorlied agent of ¢e Secretary dated sµbseque~t to 60 days from the date Jiereo~ declining to insure this SecUrity
Loan No~ .802~1000025
F~ Utall SecuHfy ,Jnstru1111:11t·(l\~ .Modified)
-UIE.COMl'.lL\lfCE SoUitcE, ~c;.:......
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his~el!t .~d-~e)'J9Jt; ;~Jtall ~ ,4~¢e~ CQn¢lusiv.i;: proqf of..~uqh in~ii'gt"bility.. No:twltlisrancimg ·.~.fotepg, ~s
·opµQilJ:!J.ay not be ~xe~i~d l,ly Lender when the un.ayailab~- _ofinsllr~ce;.is-,.solely due tc, Le~~er!s µthtre to Temit a,
m·ortgage ins.1.n;mce premium:to fu:e:s·eoretmy.
·
·
. ·-10; Remsiatement. Borrower has a right to be rem.stated jfLender has requireu irn.l:nediate payment in.full
· b~use 9fBt¥roW~.r~ faµ~ to pay ;3J.l $:t}o1.U1t.du~·under the-Note 9r ~~~ ~c\?PtY: I~ent. T1tj_s ~f ¥.P1~,r~ye.i,:
~er foreclosure proce~gs:~-~f:Uted~ Tore~ate.the Secuti,ty rnstrurp.ent, BQ.r.rOWe,t $bilJi.tend~.fu ~i°lumP. sll.Dl
all ·amo'llllfs_'.req~:tobring BQJrPWei's account-current incluaing to the exte11t they ijie obligafion~ ofB9rr.ower. und~
thili: Sec~ty Tostrwn~ roieclos.ure oosts and reas~iilile ·and• cusfu~ary· attorilo/.si .fees .and expenses properly:
~~ociated. "4th -~ (ot~I~~tire pr~~ing~ l.Jpqn -,n:instate~~nt ~Y :BQm;>W~i- this Security Inspiiiµe.n.~ ~~ t~
obJi&ations: :dliit jt S!;:Cµt"e$ sb,aJI remain in effect .as ·jf~n4e:r, ~ ,not required imme.diate .P.~tment in:full ·mnv~vei:?
Lender is .D.ot re:quired. to. pennii reinstatement if: (i} Lender-:has accepted reinstatement after the commencement: oi
:foreclo~e proceedhigs withbi two :years· ~ecliateJy- p~~dfug: the· ccmilne_ncemem of .a _cttr.rent: forecfosme:
·p;r9ceeding,. (ii) ~iii~~tepi~.i)t- will. ~lude· f9r¢clos~ pn· diff~rent _groUJ;lµs' ~ .the future, -or {iii) :.relll~ateinent
advcr~Jy affect the priority of the lien,~qreaf:ed_ by ~ .~t.nity ,Instrument
··
11. Bof!OW~r·Not Released; Forbear;uiee b:y Under Not a.Waiver. Ext~on ofiM tim:e ofpayment-or
modification ofamortization ofthe· 5UJJis :secured by this Sect~ insti'timent: granfed by Lender to any successor in
interest• .of Be>-m>V!'ei'_ sb!lll nQt ope,ate 'to)'e1$fi· :the· _iiabtmy of the (?Ii.gin.Bi :/3onower ~r Borr~wer's. ~uccesso,r in
inie~st. Lend~.r -~h,all nqt be regmred to' comm~.Qce proceedfu~ .against' ~y s~c.ccs,;;or_in 11)1ei:est or ~tilse Jo ~*.nd
time forpaym,~nt or otherwi11~, modify ,amQrti~ipn of tbe
sec~cl by. this. S.e~~ .Instrument,by. ;re~on -of aw
demand made cy the- orlgmai ·Bm:r.ower o:r BOirowei's su.ccessots lil interest Any foib.e.arance by Lender in:exercising
any rig1it or-remedy.shalhiot bo fwaiyet of or ]#eplud~~ e~~tcj.~ ofBJJY right:or remedy;
. 1.21. ,S.i,.ecessor~ ~d ,As~- Bound; ·.10J~t .~d. Seveni] L1~billty; C~g,tte~. Th~ CQVen~ts and
agreem,ents. of this Sec.urity Instrument' .shall •Jjind and benefit tb,e su.cce~sp~- and as,sigm~ of 4'ild~r ~d BOJrower,
subject to the prowioqs of Paragraph 9(b). Borrowetii' oo:vei:umts and agreaine.nts shall be joint: and several. Any
Bottower who- co,.signs this: Secupty J~eµ~ but c1q·es not execute the ~i;itez (a) is. ·oo,.signing this Sec¢ity
.ms~Jl.t o-11Iy .to $®gage;_p.it imtl c.anvet :tfii¢: ~on'6}ver~ ilitere~ in tli~ f r ~ W}der the te~ .of~ Security
~ n t ; (b) i$ no( pe;rsp~ t:tJ:;.ligated ta: pay the· su~ ,s~_c.ur~~ by th~ -~:arity {nstrnment; c!lld: (c)-.agre.es th~
lender and .any other Borroweimay·agre.e to extentt modify, forbear or make anyaccommpd11tipns with°.regatd to the·
ttnn oftins ·&cmity ln.stniment otthe_Note 1y.ith:o1it ~t ~on;t>wers consent
p, Notices, 4ny no~ce Jo B9u-Qwer provltiecl .for in this Securtty:Jn~trn.m~.µt s~l b~ _giv¢.~ PY .*.liverm,g it '
or 'by mai.H~_it,b;y firsJ class-mail unless appiicabl~ law reqµfres use of anQil)en;nethod. The. n9tice. ~ be directed· to
the P..r::ope.rty Adclress . or.any othet·ooc1:ress Borrower desigiµites o/ notice ft? Lender..Alrf notfoc Lender shaIJ be
giv,:~ 1?.Y- in:~t das~ P.J,ail ~ :µmd~'s address stated~ o.r ~Y aclih.-#.ss µndet designates by-li_otice to Bog9~er. Al}y_
:no~ce proyjdedJ'or it;l:t:bis S~ty-Instrument sh.all be doomed to have.been giye~ to· B'oir~et or'l~;n.iier w~e.11 gi~
as provided mthis paragrapll.. ·
•
·
i 4.: Governing Law;-Sever.alJil1ty; TiifiSecurlfy. Instrument sb.~t be governed by·Federal law and theJaw,of
the jurisdiction fu whlcli the Ptopelfy is'Iocateci: 1n:fue ere,iiqhat·any-provision:or cianse of this Security JAmQrilent o:r
1Ije·l:'fQte .ce>ilfiiqs·wi~-ajl~c.$1~ !_11,wt' $Ubh: .coilfli_!?f: shail 11ot. ~ t ot;µerpro.yisio.µs o(tbis·Security Instrwnent .pdh~
~ote which can be;given eff~twjfbout the ~onfµcting provision.. To tms end the provisions ofthis Se~ ~ n t
and the Note are decl~d to be ~verable,
·
15. Borroweti~ Copy. Borrower shall be .given one confonned copy. of the ,Note and of' this Secllllty

·wm,

s:ums

fo.

:instrument.

·

. :t6;

Hazar~ous Substances. Bo.rrow,er sh~I ;n.ot ca~~, _or petm,if 1he pi'~nce.f ~, _(ij?}>9sal. ~rage; or
release pf any 1Iazar:do~ Substances .on· orin the- Property. Borrower-~~ nQt 4.oJ nqr allow ·anyQDe' else to do,
anything affecting the.Property that km violation ofany Enmmimental Law. The _pr~g two·~niences shall.not
appiy w~e p~~~e~. ~ Qi:~omgtj ¢.i. tqe, Pr.oper.f1 of· sni~I qu~~es o~Hazardous Substances that are ge~etally ·
~o~ to·b.ei)J)j)ropriat.~ loJioim&l.~sidenµ~. useg•and to maint.e~ o(tl,1¢ PI:wny,
.
.,.
Borrower snail promptly ;give Lender wmten· notic!) f)f· a:ey m:vestigf\UOn;, plaiql. <l,emandJ ~suit or pth~
actionby any goveJJiiiJ~.tital orreguhrtciiy agency or·privaie"party :involving tJle Pi:~rty :and any-~dotJS Substance.
or -Environmental Law of whibli· '.Borrower has actual ·1mowledge. 'lf Borrower 1eams1 or· is; notlfi«.f by aiiy
gq:,/etWA~J1fal or re~~ozy ·~utho:rity, that a,µy tem~vaJ of c,ther-jemediatiaii oC:an)tHazartious Substances affecting t1ie
roan:

No: so2-100002s ......
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.Pl'.op~rty fa necessazy, Boi;rower sbal1 promptly Wee.~ necessary remedi&l ~l)ris fu acoorda,n~e with Envii'Qnmentai.
.Law. ·
·
·
· As used mthis'- Paragraph. i'(j;_ "H~atdous Sµbstances~, are .1hose s11bstances defined as toxic- .or hazardous
:sub$Jces by tµyiro;aµt~~µd_Law !lnd-.fi!e fo.lle>vroig_~~b~~; ~line, kerosene; ·other flammable or ~q
pe1;rQlyUni F,~qcts, tQ~c pesticld~ ancl he,rl;dci~es, 'VQlc1tile ·so~ rii.&ten~ ~faining its~~~ or fOllilalpe;hycte,
and ·.radioactive. material~ Mused ,in tw Paragrapb 16,.-'.''Envirorunenqil Law') ]]ie~ &icl~ lmv~ 'anQ laws, ,of the
· · juclscfictfon: where tlie Pr.operiy isJocated that relate to heilltli, safety or environmental p.rotecfi011;
NON.:.UNIFORl\.:l CO~NA.N'.f:S. Borr9wer~d L~il~er furfh~:¢c;>Ye~'tti:ri~ agr~ as follows:
1"f. A~gnment. 0.f Rents; Borr9Wer Wlconditfonally assi_gns :an9 transfers tQ Le;nder all .the rents; and
rev.e.nues of pie ·Ptop·e.rty... Borrower authorizes Le.nde:r oi iendels: agents to collect the reJ1ts and revenues and
h~re~y q~c,S -~l_i.-ttj:t@t qfthe:Pr9p_eny to p~y_tlii, rents to Le~a~ w.L~P.d~1s agents. Hoirever,.prlorto Lei:tdtj"'s
notice· to Borrow~r of'Borrower'.s .bi~ach of any covenant or agreement in :the ·secm:ity Insti'wnent '13orrqwer, ~B:1,l

collect and recejve all rents and ,revenues· of the Property as truste.e for. the benefit of_Lt,nder arid Borrower. 'This:

.~ignm~.nt ofrents coi;l._s,titqt¢$ ~ a~s9il;lf~ ~sigrimt?ntatid nqt ~ assigmg~:!i.f .f~ additiona.i securrty. only.
·
!(Lender gives notice oftire~b to Bql]"OW~ (a). aU :re~ re~ived· by:B011ower shali be li«#by B9.rroW~r

as trost~ for .benefit·ofLencler on1y ~ to be _applied 1o -the SW31$. secured. bY. the.Secu.r,i.ty' Tnstrtinlent (b) Le~~uhaU
be entitled io collect and receive all of the· rents of the .Property; and· {c) .eacll tenant- of the Jlrope.rty· $hall pay all
te,:nts due· .and unpaid to t.e.ncier or Lendei'~ agent 01tLendels written demand-to.the tenant
.. ·· BQ'JJ"ower Ji~ iot ~~c1J1~~ ~ priqr assignment c>f th.~ r~nts l;!l,i~ Jil!S -~at and '.Will-not pe1forin any act that
W9rJld prevent Lend~r fi:qril.~xe~ii!lll8 jts rlghts·under. thfs Pa.ra,grapb, ·11 •.
Lenqer sh~t ··not be·reqrifred to -~ter· up.on, take c.onfr.or of or m$~.th~ Prqperty l,efore or after giving
notice :of breach to Borrower. However, Lender or ajudfo1a11y appointed .re.ceiver may do-so ~t any time there. is. a
bre.~h. ,Any app~icatfon of ~nts shall not .c~~ .or ~iliye ,any .default :or invalfdate ·any otliet :rlgbt or remedy .of
Lender. This·as.si,grwient ti(rents of the Property ~l;la:11 terminate when ili~ del!t seemed byih* Sec.WitJ m$iP:nem is

p~fu~
.
.
i& Forecfomre .Procedure If Lender ;reqwres immediate pay)llent, -~. full :1,inder Paragr.apJi ·91
l,,ender iqay imrok~-tJte p~er of'saJe,a~d- any olher reiµedies permitted by appli~ole Jaw. Lender s~all -be
~ntitled to ~oJiect ~ll· ~pen~es incurred :in, pursuing tlte r.em_edi~ ptoYifled j~ this ·y~grapll i_s;_ in~J{ding,

tq, reaso11able attorneys' fees and costs oftitle evidence.
if'tlle power of ~Je1s:invoked; Trustee sbalfexecute a wrlden notice or-the occw-_rence oho event of
default·- an_() qf. l~e electiQn t9 cau~~ t~e Prop~ey to l>¢ soit1 ~i,,d ~~ai.J :record such· notice in each county- i~.
which any part' of th~ Property js Jo~ted•. Lend~:r or Tnrst~e shall mail copjes of suc'b ~ofi~.~ t~e manner
prescribed by applitabie Jaw to llorro.w.er and: to;the other persons prescn"'he4 by appJJ~bl~ Jaw. In-. th~ eyent
:Bo'rro~,.~r: d~es not cure the default witiun. tlie period .then _prescribed by ~ppJj~ble iaw, Trusiee slia11 give
p9blI~ :u,otic~· of-th¢ :$.~e- to .th~ per~oi.ls ~:rid ~n tlie :ma~~et J>r~crlbed by. applicabie Jaw. After the time
reqttir~ 11:Y ~pplfoabJe:Jaw, Tr:ust.ee,·witJiout cJ~mal)d ()n Ir.orrow~r, ~~I ~ell tl~e·P.ro_pertf at pubij~·anctio)( to
but no·t fimited

the highest bidder at. ilie' time· and. place u.tider the t~r.ms.· designat(ld tn. i_~e potice- ·ors.al~ .i~ one or more
p·arcels and in any .otiier• t.rustee. determines .(but subject fo -a·ny statutory riglit· of Bot.rower tQ -direct the
or~er _m_ :w1Q¢~ ·tJ_ie ,Prop~:rty, if co~~sting ,of.several '.known Jots ,or :parceis, shall .he sold)•. Trustee may; in
accordance·wit1-.appJicabl~ Jaw, p~stpone ssle:ofall 9r-any parc•ei _tjf th~ Prop~rzy by pubiit ann·~~c~e~t-at
the tim¢ an:d place of-2,my previously scliedwed ·saJe.· Lender or-its designee-niay purc~~e llieP,operty at .any

sale..
Trustee s!tali d~liver (9 the 'p:iµ"~a$er Tru~~ee•s dee.d conveyi11g; the :Property Without any covenan~
or warl;'anty, _expressed o_l." implie~ 'J'he recitals jn. ihe Tnis~e's de¢..shall ~e ppma :fa~~ ev1dence of the
.tru.tb. of the _statement.$ :made there.in, Trustee sh~II ~ppJy the pro~_eds o( :ihe sa~e in tb~: foJJowJng: order~.
_(~) to all expenses of the salt;; focJudi'ng, bot not li:m1teil fo; :reasonable Trustee~s and _attorneys' tees; (b)'t(;-aJJ
~~~~ -~ec~r~d,).ytJi,is Security rnstrlUHent;. and (c)·.any exces's'.to the person . or: persons legally entJtled fo it or
to the ~o"(lnty ~~rlt of the county in w_hfcb the s~l¢tQo}c. place. .
..
If the Le_,der's.· i»terest ·i,11. Uris -Security mstrumeilt: ,is ·held PY (Jie Secretary and the .$ecr.eJary
requires immediate· payment !•:a- full m1d_et Paragrapn 9, 'the S~cretary 1µa;jr h1voke th.e no~judi#al pow.er of

IDan. Nb: 802-1000025
. FaA,ilta~ Security im~mcnt(MERSM?diflcrl).
-Dre ~ ~ C E $Ql7llC~ JNc.·ww,-t1XUrflizinca""""'.toDI
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sale. P.f pvidell in t~e Sin;le ;F~mily, .1'4<1r~age_ Fpreclosqte Act .of ,1994 ("Ac~) (1.2 :'(!,$.~- § 37~· d gg.), ~y
requesting a. fQr.eclosur~ commissioner- designated -under the .Act to coiµm~n~- fotecJosure ·and to sell tlle
Pi:<>perty·-as p3:ov~de1lin._tlie.;A-ct No(hiiig}n tiie· ptececling sent~nce_sban deprive, tli~ Se_cret;1ry oi'anr :r.igh~
-ofhef;w'i~~ ay~~ll!W~ ai~.n~er .,~der·f]µ~.far.agr~ph 18 o·r appl_foablelaw.~i9. ~;conv.~y~i:i~~ ·Upon paymtajt .of ~I ,sums ~eciµ'~ "bi thl~ =sec:;up~· ];ilstrument~ Lender shali request
Tr1.1stee -to recan:vey the Ptoperly 1lllP _$hall $urtendpr ~ Securljy ~~em ar;i~ -~) ntjtes ~-v.idtmcijl.g d~qt s~cu.r¢~
by this• Secui'icy lnsirument ·to Trus.tee; Trnsfoe ,shall ·reoonvey the Pr.operty· w.~thput w~~:ty. (o· 1h~ p~r$OU' :or
per.sorts )egally- entitled .to it _Such pets$. ~r"J;*~~~ $hall PIO' any reco.rdation costs~ Lender may charge- such.
peI'SOll or_pe.i'so~ ·a fee fop~cori~ffeg $e l'°.rqpertyj put o~- if tJi~.f~ is pmd to athird:PartY (such as tne-Trustee)
fo,r services.i;eµdereµ.-and the ch,arging ofthe·Jee js nermitted nndet np_pijca,ble I~~.
. ·
2-0. .SJihsfJiute Trustee; Lender, at: its cption, may from. time to. tµµe re.m.c;we Trustee, ~d appoint- a
successor trustee to. any ·T:rustee aj>j>oint~-<f hcreun~e;. Without co.nveyam:;~ .of.the .Properly, the.6uccessor trustee
sllall :s1ic¢.e~ ter ajl,: th~ ti~e; pt:rw~i~d ijuti~s CQn.ferred µp9ri-T~~~;h¢~~iil m1d,by ap~licablelaw.
z:n~ 'Re~est fe>r .N0,ticesr Borrower ~ques~ that' copi~: :e>f th¥ nptic_es pf gefau"4 -~d sal~ .be ·se~t -to
· Borr.owet1s address whicli is the Property· Address.
. 2i. ji,iers to .tJrl~ s·ecurlcy ~ils(tument. If· one ot more riders are. execu~d :by Borroww .and recorded
toge~er with thls Sec.wity IQ.sfru,ment tlle ~ovepants,of eac:b, su~h rider shall be 1ncotporate.d_ into and shall amend
and su_pple.tneni th~ -co.venants cµrd ·agreements of th,is Secµri,ty ,lits(nllneiit as if (lie ddet(s) ·w~.r~, a p~ of :@.s
Security !nstnmie¥.. (Check:appiicable'box(es))~
. ··
- ··
· .
.
.

,o

0'
~

D

C.ondonrinitrili Rider

Pl~ed Unit,-Devei~pment Rider

□- Or@ga.~4 :payment Rider
GrO)Ving Egmty :R.id.er

0

:Other [specify]

BY Siq~G. :BE):.OW, ijqtrqw~r~9.~pts ~d agrees to the ~.mis .and covenants. contained-in tlµS.Security
I:nstrµm~tand ill ~y rider(s) executed'by Bor.rowe.r and recorded ·Willi -i~;

Wft:nesses:

----------..:..:....._.;...:.....,....,_~- ($eaj.)-.Bcnowi:r,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (S~ai)

.:.Borrowei

-....:..--------....----,-------- (Seal)

-Bao;t!WU

Q
!ban No: :86.t lOOboiS

.

~ '7f;l'1 ~w#y ~~~~~i~Moal_fi=d)

- ~ _c;q~~SQJJ,\le~~C,.-WWW:complbuicea~.c:om
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§:

. The foregoing mstrume~t was acknowledged ·before m~ this
SAMQEt D. ADAM.SON
.

(dat~).by

gIo_ II?iJ_n- .

•

IDanNo: 802--1000025

FHA '()'tAh Seeut#y.~irllllierit (MER~ ModJijed)

-Trot CoMPµ'ANCE SOtnlt:!E:, JNc.~
wv,w.c,0mpliuiecsovrQ,.am,
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1:.....FHA_,_.
_·._ease_:
- ·_,Ni_~_:,_s2_1-_G_43_96_J_ci-_:i_os_·_

___,, '

FHA PLANNED UNIT DEVELOP.MENTRID.ER.
·oos,· PL~D U:N1T. J)E~t-O?MENT WO~R 18 II$~<;:· tlu~
31st
dw' Qf
. .Au.911str 10 07
,. and is. .ittcm:porated. 'mto and .&ball ·be deemed to amend ~ supplement .the
.Mo.t'.tglige, Dee4 of Tro,:st 9t S~titr ,De~d f"Secmfty Jnst¢.w.e,Iiti') of W. ~e !{a.~ gi~eh by the. 'iµide,rsign_eq
.B.oirower~) to secure Borrowers Nofe to GUIID - ~ - COJ.i,:1PANY, .A, CALI~
CdRPORATION
11

(

(

Len~er{') o,f th.~ sa.ine dare-a~a tj)veiiil.g $.e;Prqpeey·d~~¢b·~ Pi,~~- Se~ty lnsm,un~nt ~.located at;
70 W. ·QR,Caz®) LANE, W E ~ , ill' 84.780
·

11

'[Property Address/

·

·

The Property Address is ?- part· of ~plaimed unit.tltj,ei$.llentfiPtJDil) known as

TaE

FIELP$
{Name of Planned Unil Dey~Jopmen(!

Pl)JJ COVENAN1$; In .adclitlqn to. the .~oveJJall~ ~d. ag¢el)leii.ts. maq_~ )n tll~ Securicy I~trumen.t,.

.Borrower and Lender furl.her covenant and agree as follows!
A.

.· .

So iong as the Owneis Association (or equivalent entity holding tille. to c0mmon. .areas and
fa~liti.es), ·:ac:µI,lg as tmstee for th~· ho.weqwners., :iti~~A~, with,~ genetany f:i~~{e4 i~ce
canier, a11.master1' or 11olan1cet1-· policy ittsnrfug, the property locafud in file Pup', •including all
:imprqy~~- now .~xisting or•Ji:~eaftei: etroted on 1;b,e w.prtgageg, p:rem~~ and, such policy 1s
satisfactory, to .Lender and prov.ides insuranc.e· coverage: fo .the. .mriO• for the periods, and
.aMJpsl th<;i hazards Lemier; :r:equites; :mcludi,iig fire-and oth¢t lfµru:$. included Witliµi tb,e• term
11
extended coverage'' aitd .loss by flood, tb' the extent iequire4 l>y ~ :Secretm:y; then; ·(i) Le~der
~es the J?ril:visicm. in P~ph. .2 of. ,this s~urtty· ~ep.t :fo,i;- th¢ ·1119:ntl»y pa:y,m.~t to
.Lender of one-twelfth of the yearly premium installments for.hazard in,surance .on-11ie Property,
anQ (iO B9µ:<rw.~s ~bl,ig~~J} und~ fai:a~ 4_ :ti¥~- Se(;Ority histrµnient to ma:hiµu:µ. haz~a
i n ~ ·coverage on.the :Propercy is d~me·d'satisfied to the e~~~_that_ the req_ufu:;d covera~e is
ptovidea ·py·r;he· n~vners As~otj~tfon. PQlicy; Bcittower shall give Leildet prompt notice of a:ajr
lapse in. l'equired hazard :insurarice coverage· and of any loss .oc~~~ :frci~ a h.azarcl. In' the
~vent of a . ~tno1,it,io1r Qf ~ in~n:c;e pio~eeds 'lll Ji~ of restoration .or repair .followmg a
lo$ to the· property or to comm.011 areas .atld (apilities of tlie J'UD, any px:oceeds paya.ol~ fo
Bt?l!9wer. aie, lieieby ::iBsigne~-ahd shall be 1j'aid ·to tender for application:to ·the sw:ns ~ed :by
this Security ;Instrument-, with, any~ paid ·tQ the ei:itl.ty·le~y-~~-:the~,

B.

Boll'Q.wer pro.mis~ to·pay··a,11 .d:nes ?rid asses~~ts ~wposed p~rsnant to tne Jegat ins~eri~
.creating and goveririilgt.he POD.
·

C.

Jf Borrower does not pay PUD. dues and assessmc:nts when: due~ t.&en Lender ma:y pay theI11; kry
~~ dl&1.iJJrsed cy Lerui~r mideI' ·tbutparn~ph: 9 shall liecome-~diµonal debt of-Borrower·
sec;ured by. the :Security Instru;Qle;nt. 1Jn.Ies~, ;Bp~wet- $1d ~der agree to o~r terms·. Qf

,

Q

payment, these amomiis shail bear interest from 1he date of disbursement at the:Noto rate and.
shall'b~ p1,1yab~,· with, fufere~ up~n nofiece· fr9m teii4et to ;i;=icitfy)wer req,)estin~ji~yri,:Lent
----,------------fS!gnatures<Jn Fpf/owlng_,Pii(!O',_..__,._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MIN: 10001'9980210000253

Loan No:· 802-1000025
·l<'HA,~~ lmit Devlil~~eni ~ (MnW.sfate)
.....,.niiW6.Ml"UANCE SoiJRCF;;-'.(~Cr--Wjn'J'~OOIII'
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BY 'SIGNING BELOW., Bol;'[owencc.epts and :agr~ to the term~ and Pitl:~Qns· cqrttllned in tbi~ ;E1UD

·(Seal)
...Borrower

(Seal)

($~)

-Borrower

-B~Wf/t

-----''---'-----,.:------ 4Space·Be/ow thls UM.For Acknov.iledgmsnq - - - - - - - - - -

tDan No:. so2 ....100002s
B.HA.P.lam1!!:d Unit Develop;nimt Rider (Multis~te) .

-THE COMPl,JAN~$.ovii.cE,1NC.,- .
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Noti~e ofDefault.Page 1 of 2:
Rus:sell .$h1~t~ Washington County Recorder
0p.f.25/2-0Q.9 S)2:i34-:l4 PM F·ee $·12.00 By
B~cl<rnart FPTP

,i

After R:~corq,ing Retu:m to!

RECONTRUST CO~ANV; N.~
43~0 Performance Dr; T.XZ-985-0.7.'..03

,R.jc~a}'.dson, 'I:X 75082

TS#.; .09 ,..q,d8i'SS-4
TSG#: 5.-05:1603.
SP/l~AB.OYETHJS·LINEFQRRECO.RDER.'SUSE

.NOTICE. OF DEFAULT.':AND ELECTION TO SELL
Qn QJ: abQut AugusU 1, 2007, SAMUEL D. ADAMSON, A M.ARRlJ{D tv.rAN, .AS: HlS :SOLE A.ND
$BP.ARATE-PROPERTY, as Tr.ustor, executed .and deiiv~red to· SCOTT !:/()ND.BERG:; A MEMBER ·Of
·THE UTAH STATE BAR as Trustee, for the· b.enefit o:fl\fORTO/\.GE ELE¢TRONIC::-REQI.S1'RATJON
~YSTEMS,, JNC., as Beneficiary, a certain Trust Dee9 to .sec:ure the peiforinajlce QY th~ Ttustor of the
-obligations under a Promissory No~. The Ttil~t De~d ·was recot~aj fo th.e Qflice pf the W~hin~on
County Record~r, .as Instrument.No. 200700448.3~ 6Ti: :$~ptemb~r- 6; ~097 artd cover.s m~ following. reM
property:

.4J:;l, o:tJ ioT THIRTY oNE-:(31), THE Fmms - PHASE 'l; AecoRJ)J:NG 'fo THE ormc:rAL
Pi.A'f THEREOF, ON FIL~ cy THE. OFFICE. OF THE RECORDlm. OF WA.SBlNGTON
COUNTY, STATE OF urAir
.
Together with all th~ jmprovem~nt~ now or .nereaft.ei: .eteqt~d pn the property:> and all ~emellt$,
apptfrteriance$) .and. fjxtw~s now or hereafter a part ofthe property.
·
MORTGAGa, $LECTRONIC REGISTRATrON SYSTEMS,. lNC. is presentiy the ·holder of the
b¢11.efi¢ial° inter~$t unqer the Trust.Deed, ·and RECONTRUST. CQMPANYl N.A., is the trustee. A ·breach
of ari :olJltgatipQ for Which the'trust property was. conveyed as secunty. h~ PC.CtJrr~.d. Payments are ·du~ for
the months c:i:f January 200.9 through June 2009· in the .amount of,$I,6a0.29 p¥r 1~orrt.h, together\v.-th _any
u-p.pajq 't.8l{e~;, i:Qsutance and other obligations· under th~ Promiss(>ry ·N9t~ a~d Trust bi~d~ Un<ler the
pr6visfoi,"ts· of the Promissory Note and ·rrust Deed, the principal bafa.M¢ of $21~~06.96 is .acce.lerat~d ·
aiid 'JJOW .due~ ·together with accruing inte;resf, Jaf(;l charges; costs -~d. b11steesf· an.d· attorneys; .fees"
Accordingly, the trustee has eJected·to.·sell the property descn"becf in the TnistDe~ as provi,de<i in._Titfo .
57, Ch~pt~r 1-, Utah Code Annotated (1953)~ as am.ende4 and suppi~mented~
. .

·.. ·

r

20.090024680 06/25/2.009 02::3-4:34 PM
Washington County
·
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Texas

STA:TEOF _ _ _~ _
COUNTY OF

vb-:~ l

: •0tufas.

On
j) Cl
? .befo:te:n1.~
Ohrist(?phet A. Willlatns
persoiially appew.ed He}~n:H~n~e.n1
knoWn. to.me (or prov.edfo rpe on the .Qatb qf _______..,.........~ or-thto~gh _ _ _ _ _
to be :the-person
wno_se naro~ is .s.v6~crl~to the for~goiilg; ~en~ and acknowledged tp me·~ he/.sbe executed-rpe.s~¢ (ortli~
-...J·

-pilrp'oses and·-consideratipn therein expr~secL .
'11/1,NE~.I',{y H A ~ SEAL

Notary

~~~MS

_..:_· ·_i11-iRl$'
fO_·~~~-:~Yfl_
· ·, ••--~--~-.. '.·
My-~ommlsslon~~res
.

. ._

'

' :~..ltOf~

Ta>(ID: W-Fos:..1-31

\June--2~. 2P1~

: ·

;

.:

·

·" - •
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B:~.ss.elt~shirts. Washln{JtdO :County-' Reccitd~t
04/P,5:l~:OJQ:.-·JE4Z!S?\AM F~~t $1:i.:GO.· By

:·t

:Backman F:PtP·

:-:ii~¢9~iN-9'~~$~mtj:-~tnf:· - -

:.BAC:lIOME::LOf~S-SER~~~~ A:f'fK.A: . . . . .
COUftr.R:Y~/ID,E.HOM£.t6ANsJsEltv.iciNG'tp·

·

:.,

~--~~~i~~~~···:·-,,. ;
SAC HOME:fi<JAl-TS:SBRVIClNG;· lP::F.RA · ·t ..

;(i6t,~ywrriJiJioi~ioANS:~akviw.9,. ~f~
~~#.~QYN$R-¥,W,ID-~W4.~;S~3S;.,SlMLVALLEY;.

~~4J.~~~~~~i.ri. , . ~~~~~--;,,~-v~~"1~"'' YIV\~4.

.

TS#: 09 JJ08i584.

T-SGi{$.+OSJ'6.03.

i'ltusm'.Jh:t"g
.DEED
.
-

:

1•

·Jlt~1~1iill!l■tfiiit

W~$h-in.gtq~;tQ1,mfy, ~$.~~:.ofU.iwk·Q1' :~~pt~mtet 6,. :2007:J ·a$J1~stt,ument No~~200700,#g3'g; J1nd·'oi'Weted
Jfi~_prpp~µy:ci~sctib~cl.'~¢1P"Wf
a~ci'
·
·
·
·
·
.
.
·,;
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No. 12-4150
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD AND GWEN DUTCHER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.

STUART T. MATHESON; MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON,
P.C.; RECONTRUST COMP ANY, N.A.; BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING LP;
and BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees,
STATE OF UTAH

Amicus Curiae.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE OFFICE
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY IN RESPONSE TO THE
COURT'S BRIEFING ORDER
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") is a bureau of the
United States Treasury Department charged with the administration of the
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq., and oversight of the national banking
system as well as the system of federally chartered savings associations. The OCC
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has comprehensive authority over the chartering, supervision, and regulation of
virtually every aspect of the operation of banks organized under the National Bank
Act and other statutes, including 12 U.S.C. § 92a.
The OCC is authorized generally to represent itself in litigation by 12
U.S.C. § 93(d), comes within the authority of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
29(a), and has been invited by the Court to file this brief

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Under 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), what state does 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[] to"
when a national bank based in one state serves as the trustee of a trust deed on real
property located in another state?
2. If the state 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[s] to" is not the state where the real
property is located, may the national bank conduct a non-judicial foreclosure
notwithstanding the fact that the state where the real property is located - while
allowing a bank to serve as a trustee of real-property trust deed- permits only two
types of trustees to conduct non-judicial foreclosures: 1) any active member of the
state bar "who maintains a place within the state where the trustor or other
interested parties may meet with the trustee"; and 2) title insurance companies that
"actually do[] business" and maintain "bona fide office[s] in the state"? See Utah
Code § 57-1-21.
3. Is 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 a permissible interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a that is
entitled to Chevron deference?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This amicus brief responds to the Briefing Order of the Court on May 31,
2013, inviting the OCC to comment on any of the issues in this case, but

-2-
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instructing that the OCC pay particular attention to the questions stated above.
The OCC responds to those questions below.
The regulation at the center of this case, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, governs national
bank trust powers generally, and is not at all specific to the use of those powers in
the context of a deed of trust and foreclosure. Because this case arises in the
context of foreclosure, we preface our answer to the Court's questions by briefly
addressing the role of foreclosure in the real estate lending process, and the OCC's
enforcement role with respect to abuse of foreclosure processes.
National banks have express authority under 12 U.S.C. § 371 to make loans
secured by real estate. Section 3 71 also authorizes national banks to service loans,
an authority that includes the power to foreclose upon collateral. See OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 646 (April 1994) ("Lending includes not only the initial
extension of credit but also collecting payments, foreclosing on collateral if the
debtor defaults, and managing [acquired] assets."). It is well-established that
national banks have the authority to acquire real property assets through
foreclosure on loans or in satisfaction of debts previously contracted, and to hold,
manage, and convey such assets in the course of their dealings. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 29 (Second), (Third).

-3-

A-47

Appellate Case: 12-4150

Document: 0101909ffi189l

Date Filed: 07/19/2013

Page: 10

The OCC expects national banks, in all aspects of loan servicing, including
foreclosure, to comply with all applicable laws and have strong internal controls.
When deficiencies have been discovered, the OCC has taken aggressive actions to
hold national banks accountable and to get the problems fixed. In April 2011, the
OCC, together with the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS,") took formal
enforcement actions against 12 mortgage servicers, including Bank of America,
for unsafe and unsound practices related to residential mortgage loan servicing
and foreclosure processing. See News Release 2011-47 (April 13, 2011). These
enforcement actions consisted of cease and desist orders requiring the national
bank mortgage servicers to promptly correct the deficiencies. On February 28,
2013, the OCC executed amendments to the cease and desist orders with most of
these servicers. These amendments by the OCC (in addition to actions taken by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) have resulted in payments
to-date of approximately $2.4 billion by the servicers to borrowers whose homes
were in foreclosure in 2009 and 2010. See http://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-

protection/foreclosure-prevention/correcting-foreclosure-practices.html
(accessed June 14, 2013). Y Wrongful practices of the sort addressed in the
11

The OCC has additionally issued guidance on the handling of imminent
foreclosure sales to large and midsized national banks and federal savings
associations, which requires servicers to review foreclosures prior to their completion
-4-
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aforementioned enforcement orders are not at issue in this case, and, by filing this
brief, the OCC in no way condones any unsafe or unsound foreclosure practices
engaged in by Bank of America or ReconTrust.

12 U.S.C. § 92a
The statute at issue, 12 U.S.C. § 92a, is codified with the national banking
laws,'l! and states in relevant part:
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to
grant by special permit to national banks applying therefore, when no( in
contravention of state or local law, the right to act as trustee * * * or in any
other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other
corporations which come into competition with national banks are permitted
to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located.
12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The succeeding statutory provision further clarifies the
meaning of this text by specifying that when a state authorizes fiduciary powers by
State banks, trust companies or other corporations which compete with national
banks, the exercise of such powers by national banks "shall not be deemed to be in

to ensure the servicer is complying with applicable laws and regulations and that
approp1iate foreclosure prevention efforts have been made. Id.
Y Section 92a was originally enacted as part of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913
and amended in 1918. fu 1962, Congress removed section 92a from the Federal
Reserve Act and re-enacted it as part of a separate statute administered by the OCC.
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contravention of State or local law within the meaning of this section." 12 U.S.C.
§ 92a(b )."Ji

12 C.F.R. § 9.7
The OCC regulation at issue, amended in 2001, addresses situations in
which a national bank conducts fiduciary business in more than one state. Section
9.7 interprets 12 U.S.C. § 92a by specifying that: "The state laws that apply to a
national bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a are the laws of the
state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e). The
regulation further specifies three core activities that detennine where a national
bank acts in a fiduciary capacity: the state in which the bank "accepts the fiduciary
appointment, executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and
makes discretionary decisions" regarding the relationship. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). "If
these activities take place in more than one state, then the state in which the bank
acts in a fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the state that the bank
designates from among those states." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d).

~

The OCC has stated that: "Congress's purpose in adding section 92a(b) in
1918 was to prevent states from preventing national banks from exercising fiduciary
powers through prohibitory laws while allowing their own state banks and trust
companies to have these powers." Interpretive Letter No. 695 at 11, 1995 OCC Ltr.
Lexis 194, *33 (Dec. 8, 1995).
-6-
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The Federal Register preamble ("the Preamble") to the 2001 amendments
provides the authoritative OCC guide to the intended operation of the regulation.
"Fiduciary Activities ofNational Banks." 66 P.R. 34792-01, 2001 WL 731641.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The OCC's interpretations of section 92a to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps
are entitled to judicial deference under Chevron. Smiley v. Citibank (South

Dakota), NA., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 231 & n.13 (2001 ). The OCC 's interpretations of its own regulations are also
entitled to deference so long as the interpretation is not "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation." Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense

Center, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
ARGUMENT

In response to the Court's Briefing Order, the OCC responds to the Court's
questions as follows: 1) The state in which a national bank acts in a fiduciary
capacity is where the bank is "located" for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 92a and that
state's law determines the fiduciary capacities in which a national bank may act in
any state; 2) a national bank permitted to act as a foreclosure trustee under the

laws of the state where it is "located" may act in that capacity in another state even
though the laws of that state may provide otherwise; and 3) Twelve C.F .R. § 9. 7 is
-7-
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a pennissible interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a that is entitled to Chevron
deference.

1. Under 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), what state does 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[] to"
when a national bank based in one state serves as the trustee of a trust deed
on real property located in another state?"
The regulation makes clear that the state in which the bank acts in a

fiduciary capacity for each fiduciary relationship is where the bank is "located"
for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 92a, and further identifies three fiduciary acts that are
determinative of where the bank is "located" for a fiduciary relationship. They are
the location where the bank: (1) accepted the fiduciary appointment; (2) executed
the documents that create the fiduciary relationship; and (3) makes discretionary
decisions regarding fiduciary assets. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d).11

2. If the state 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[s] to" is not the state where the
real property is located, may the national bank conduct a non-judicial
foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that the state where the real property is
located - while allowing a bank to serve as a trustee of real-property trust
deed - permits only two types of trustees to conduct non-judicial foreclosures:
~

Neither the state where the national bank is "based" nor the state where the
property that is the subject of the fiduciary relationship is located is determinative of
which state's law applies to determine eligibility to act as a fiduciary. See 12 C.F .R.
§ 9.7(b)(national bank may act as fiduciary for relationships that include property
located in other states.) See also Preamble, 66 P.R. at 34794-95: "[W]e disagree that
'location' for purposes of section 92a is appropriately determined by a main office or
bank branch. As previously discussed, the Contravention Clause of section 92a
requires that a bank look to the laws of the state in which it acts in one or more
fiduciary capacities in order to determine the limits on those capacities."
-8-
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1) any active member of the state bar "who maintains a place within the state
where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee"; and
2) title insurance companies that "actually do[] business" and maintain "bona
fide office[s] in the state"? See Utah Code§ 57-1-21.
Yes. A national bank otherwise authorized to exercise fiduciary powers
under 12 U.S.C. § 92a pursuant to the laws of the state where it is "located" for
purposes of the particular fiduciary relationship may transact business authorized
as a result of its fiduciary status with respect to property that is the subject of the
fiduciary relationship, even though the law of the state where the property is
located restricts that activity to fiduciaries recognized under the law of the state
where the property is located. See Preamble at 34793, supra ("12 U.S.C. 92a does
not subject the exercise of a national bank's fiduciaiy powers to restrictions or
preconditions, such as licensing requirements, under state law."). A national bank
permitted to act as a foreclosure trustee under the laws of the state where it is
located, here Texas, may act in that role in another state even though the laws of
that state, here Utah, may limit eligibility to act as a fiduciary for that type of
transaction to specific entities. We note, however, that the national bank is subject
to Utah requirements governing the conduct of the foreclosure, including, for
example, requirements pertaining to the notice that must be provided to the
borrower.
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3. Is 12 C.F .R. § 9. 7 a permissible interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a
that is entitled to Chevron deference?
Yes. Section 9. 7 is a pennissible interpretation because it falls within the
OCC's statutory authority to promulgate regulations implementing section 92a,
because section 92a does not have a contrary plain meaning, and because the
interpretation is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.
The regulation is entitled to Chevron deference because the other requirements for
deference are also met, including the requisite formality.
Under the Chevron line of authority, Section 9. 7 is entitled to a background
presumption of Congressional intent: that Congress contemplates that ambiguity in
a statute administered by an agency will "be resolved, first and foremost, by the
agency, and [that Congress] desired the agency, rather than the courts, to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows." Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863, 1868 (2013), quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), NA., 517 U.S.
735, 740-41 (1996). Here, Supreme Court authority establishes that section 92a(a)
is ambiguous, and does not have a plain meaning inconsistent with the OCC's
interpretation. The operative portions of section 92a(a) make dispositive the state
in which the national bank is "located."~ The Supreme Court has held that the

The text of section 92a(a) refers to a single state. The statute authorizes the
Comptroller to grant fiduciary powers "when not in contravention of State or local
?!
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term "located," as it appears in federal banking laws, has "no fixed, plain
meaning." Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 312 (2006)(national
bank is a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes of the state in which its main
office is "located."); see also id. (collecting multiple statutory applications of
"located.") The Court amplified: "'[L]ocated,' as its appearances in the banking
laws reveal, * * * is a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the context in and
purpose for which it is used." Id. at 318. Accordingly, section 92a does not carry
a plain meaning that forecloses the OCC's interpretation.
There is no other basis for withholding Chevron deference from the OCC' s
interpretation. Section 9. 7 represents an interpretation of a provision of section
92a that the OCC is responsible for administering. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 92aG);§.I 93a.
Section 9.7 is a "full-dress regulation" satisfying the formality requirements for
Chevron deference. See Smiley, supra, 517 U.S. at 741; cf United States v. Mead

law," with reference to fiduciary powers given to national bank competitors,
including "State banks," "under the laws of the State in which the national bank is
located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The most natural reading of this text, and the only
reading consistent with canons of statutory constmction and with the statutory
purpose, is that the three references to "State" refer to the same state and not to
different states. See Preamble, 66 F.R. at 34794.
"The Comptroller of the Currency is authorized and empowered to
promulgate such regulations as he may deem necessary to enforce compliance with
the provisions of this section and the proper exercise of the powers granted therein."
12 U.S.C. § 92aG).
§!
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Corp, 533 U.S. 218,231 n.13 (2001)(OCC entitled to deference even in absence of

formal regulations).
Finally, Chevron Step Two is satisfied because the OCC's interpretation of
the ambiguous statutory terms is reasonable in light of the context and purpose of
section 92a(a). There is no suggestion that .the rulemaking was procedurally
deficient. In response to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the OCC received 25
connnents, including four from state bank supervisors and one from a state bank
supervisors' organization, which the OCC considered in promulgating the final
rule. The OCC considered, and stated the reasons for accepting or not accepting,
the arguments advanced by these commenters and others. See, e.g., Preamble, 66
F.R. at 34793.
Substantively, the rulemaking, designed to provide clarity and certainty for
national banks' multi-state fiduciary activities, rested on the analysis contained in
three earlier Interpretive Letters: IL 695/f 866, and 872. See Preamble, 66 F.R. at
34792. Interpretive Letter 695 concluded that a national bank with its main office

11 There

is no inconsistency between IL 695 and section 9.7. The fact situation
addressed in IL 695 contemplated that the bank would act in a fiduciary capacity in
multiple states, and therefore would be subject to the laws of each of those respective
states. IL 695 at *34 n. 7. The fact situation posed by the Court, in contrast,
contemplates the conduct of fiduciary activities in one state with respect to property
located in another state. The principles are applied consistently in each instance.
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in one state may have trust offices in another state. IL 866 and IL 872 addressed,
among other things, where a national bank is deemed to be acting in a fiduciary
capacity for purposes of section 92a. The amended section 9. 7 codified those
interpretations. 66 P.R. at 34792.

As the Preamble explained in construing the text of the statute, the statutory
grant of authority does not limit where a national bank may act in a fiduciary
capacity, does not require that the bank's customers or the property involved in the
fiduciary relationship be located in the same state as the bank, and does not limit a
bank to acting in a fiduciary capacity in a single state. 66 P.R. at 34794. In the
rulemaking, the OCC isolated three core fiduciary activities - accepting a
fiduciary appointment, executing documents that create the fiduciary relationship,
and making decisions regarding the investment or disttibution of assets - that
'

determine with certainty which state's laws would govern for the purpose of
section 92a. 66 P.R. at 34794. The rulemaking also clarified the section 92a
delineation between substantive state law governing the trust itself and federal law
governing eligibility to act as fiduciary. 66 F.R. at 34795-96.
The reasonableness of the OCC's conclusions is further supported by its
consultation of the parallel conclusions reached by another agency, the thenindependent OTS. 66 F.R. at 34793 n.3.
-13-
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Accordingly, section 9. 7 represents a careful synthesis of statutory analysis
and policy choices, drawing heavily upon agency expertise and codifying previous
interpretations, that is entitled to Chevron deference.

-~
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CONCLUSION

The OCC appreciates the opportunity provided by the Court to comment on
the application and validity of Section 9.7.
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INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

This brief is submitted in response to the order of
the Court inviting the Solicitor General to express the
views of the United States. In the view of the United
States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
STATEMENT

1. The National Bank Act (Act), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq.,
established a system of nationally chartered banks.
"National banks are instrumentalities of the Federal
government, created for a public purpose, and as such
necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the
United States." Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S.
275, 283 (1896).
a. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) is a bureau within the Department of the
Treasury charged with administration of the Act and

(1)

2
with "superintendence of national banks." Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 254 (1995). In furtherance of that role,
the OCC is "authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the office." 12
U.S.C. 93a.
The Act vests national banks with certain enumerated powers. Among these are the power to "purchase, hold, and convey real estate," including as security for and in satisfaction of debts. 12 U.S.C. 29
(Second) and (Third); see 12 U.S.C. 371 (authorizing
mortgage lending). The Act further provides:
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by special permit to
national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law, the right to act as
trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks
and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver,
or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State
banks, trust companies, or other corporations
which come into competition with national banks
are permitted to act under the laws of the State in
which the national bank is located.
12 U.S.C. 92a(a). 1

1

Section 92a was originally enacted in 1913 as part of the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 11 (k), 38 Stat. 262. In 1962, Congress
removed Section 92a from the Federal Reserve Act and transferred authority from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to the OCC. See Act of Sept. 28, 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668. Although the provision was codified at 12
U.S.C. 92a, the 1962 statutory revision did not purport to amend
the National Bank Act or place the provision therein. See In 're
Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 67 (3d Cir. 1994). The
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The Act authorizes the OCC "to promulgate such
regulations as [it] may deem necessary to enforce
compliance with the provisions of [Section 92a] and
the proper exercise of the powers granted therein."
12 U.S.C. 92a(j). The OCC has issued regulations that
specify the requirements for a national bank to obtain
approval to act as a fiduciary and the conditions under
which fiduciary powers may be exercised. See 12
C.F.R. Pt. 9.
b. In 2001, the OCC undertook notice-andcomment rulemaking to "address[] the application of
12 U.S.C. 92a in the context of a national bank engaging in fiduciary activities in more than one state." 66
Fed. Reg. 34,792 (July 2, 2001). The rulemaking reflected advice from three prior interpretive letters in
which the OCC had been asked by national banks to
opine on their authority to act in a fiduciary capacity
in multiple States and to solicit and service customers
across state lines. Ibid. The current regulations
provide that, if a national bank has been given approval to act as a fiduciary, it "may act in a fiduciary
capacity in any state." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(a). The bank
may also market fiduciary services to customers in
other States, may act as a fiduciary for those customers, and may serve in a fiduciary capacity "for relationships that include property located in other
states." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(b).
As noted above, a national bank may exercise fiduciary powers only "when not in contravention of State
or local law, * * * under the laws of the State in
which the national bank is located." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a).
The regulations provide that, "[f]or each fiduciary
provision is nevertheless commonly referred to as being part of
National Bank Act, a convention followed in this brief.

A-72

4
relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the
state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for
that relationship." 12 C.F.R. 9. 7(d). For this purpose, the State in which a national bank "acts in a
fiduciary capacity" is the State where it performs
three core fiduciary functions: "[1] accept[ing] the
fiduciary appointment, [2] execut[ing] the documents
that create the fiduciary relationship, and [3] mak[ing] discretionary decisions" regarding the relationship. Ibid. "If these activities take place in more than
one state, then the state in which the bank acts in a
fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the state
that the bank designates from among those states."
Ibid. The regulations further provide that a national
bank's fiduciary powers are subject only to "the laws
of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(e)(l). All other "state laws
limiting or establishing preconditions on the exercise
of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national
banks." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(e)(2).
2. a. In 2006, respondent executed a deed of trust
as security for a loan on her Utah property. In 2009,
she stopped making payments on the mortgage. The
beneficiary under the deed of trust appointed ReconTrust Company N .A., a national bank, as the successor trustee. In January 2011, ReconTrust gave notice
to respondent of a planned trustee's sale of the property. In May 2011, ReconTrust conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure of the property and deeded it to petitioner. Pet. App. 3a.
Respondent remained in residence, and in June
2011, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer action to
take possession of the property. Pet. App. 3a. At a
hearing to decide possession during the pendency of
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the litigation, respondent argued that ReconTrust had
not been authorized by Utah law to conduct the nonjudicial foreclosure. Id. at 3a, 30a-31a. Under Utah
law, the power of sale in a nonjudicial foreclosure may
be exercised only by active Utah State Bar members
or by title insurance companies doing business in the
State. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (LexisNexis 2010); see id. §§ 57-1-23, 57-1-24.
Respondent argued that the sale was invalid under
Utah law because ReconTrust was neither a member
of the state bar nor a title insurance company, and
therefore was not a qualified trustee. Pet. App. 3a,
30a-3la. In response, petitioner argued that "ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct
the sale under federal law and that federal law
preempted the Utah statute." Id. at 2a. The district
court ruled in favor of petitioner. Id. at 3a, 36a.
b. The Utah Supreme Court granted respondent's
petition for interlocutory review and stayed her eviction pending appeal. Pet. App. 3a. The court focused
on language in Section 92a that gives a national bank
authority "to act as a trustee or in a fiduciary capacity
'when not in contravention of [the] State [law] . . .
in which the national bank is located.'" Id. at 10a
(brackets in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. 92a(a)). The
court stated that the "key inquiry under the statute is
determining where a national bank is 'located.'" Ibid.
The court concluded that "a national bank is located in
the place or places[ ]where it acts or conducts business," id. at lla, and that a bank "certainly acts as a
trustee in the state in which it liquidates trust assets,"
id. at 12a. The court held on that basis that "Congress ha[d] directly spoken to the question at issue,"
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making ReconTrust subject to the law of Utah-the
State in which the sale was conducted. Id. at 13a.
The Utah Supreme Court further held that, "even
if the plain meaning of the statute were not clear,"
two "clear statement" canons of statutory construction
would dictate the conclusion that Utah law controls.
Pet. App. 14a; see id. at 14a-18a. Under the first
canon, a federal statute will not be read to "pre-empt
the historic powers of the States" absent "a clear
statement of [Congress's] intention to do so." Id. at
14a (quoting Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,
534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002)). Under the second canon, a
clear statement is needed to overcome doubt "that
Congress would leave the determination of major
policy questions to agency discretion." Id. at 16a
(citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000)). The court found petitioner's
view of Section 92a, under which the "provision delegates to the Comptroller the discretion to authorize
one state to regulate the terms and conditions of a
foreclosure sale in another state," to be inconsistent
with both those canons of construction. Id. at 17a.
The Utah Supreme Court further stated that, even
if it were necessary to consider the OCC's regulation,
the court would "find the Comptroller's current interpretation of the statute * * * to be unreasonable."
Pet. App. 18a. The court described the regulation as
"inexplicably defin[ing] a bank's 'location' as the place
where it engages in three specific activities," namely,
the three core fiduciary functions specified in 12
C.F.R. 9.7(d). Pet. App. 19a. The court found "nothing in the statute itself that ascribes any particular
significance [to] these three particular acts," which
"could theoretically be performed in any location
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without regard to the location of the trust property."
Ibid.
Having concluded that the Act did not preempt
Utah law, the Utah Supreme Court reserved judgment on all other issues. Pet. App. 23a. The court
remanded the case to the district court, where "the
parties are free to raise any arguments they may have
regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale and
trustee's deed and the appropriateness of the order of
restitution." Ibid.
Justice Lee filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Justice Lee disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the statute was
unambiguous as to the meaning of "located." Pet.
App. 24a-27a. He nevertheless agreed that Utah law
governed ReconTrust's fiduciary powers, based on the
first clear-statement rule relied upon by the majority
-"that on a matter of traditional state sovereignty
over the disposition of title to property of an inherently local nature, [a court should not] lightly deem Congress to have intruded on the local state's sovereignty." Id. at 27a.
DISCUSSION

Although the decision below is incorrect, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Two
serious jurisdictional obstacles would likely prevent
the Court from reaching the merits if it granted review in this case. And while the decision below is in
substantial tension with an unpublished decision of the
Tenth Circuit, it does not squarely conflict with any
published appellate decision.

A-76

8
A. The Utah Supreme Court's Interlocutory Decision Is
Not A "Final Judgment" Over Which This Court Has
Jurisdiction

This Court's jurisdiction to review state-court decisions is limited to "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). That provision
"establishes a firm final judgment rule." Jefferson v.
City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81 (1997). "To be reviewable by this Court, a state-court judgment must
be final 'in two senses: it must be subject to no further review or correction in any other state tribunal; it
must also be final as an effective determination of the
litigation and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein. It must be the final word of a final
court."' Ibid. (quoting Market St. Ry. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945)).
The Utah Supreme Court's avowedly "interlocutory" (Pet. App. 3a) decision in this case did not finally
determine or terminate the litigation. Based on its
conclusion that the district court had incorrectly resolved the preemption issue, the Utah Supreme Court
"vacate[d] the district court's order of restitution and
remand[ed] for additional proceedings." Id. at 2a.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that the parties
had "raise[d] a variety of other issues relating to the
validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the validity
of the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of
restitution." Id. at 23a. Those issues remain to be
resolved in the first instance by the district court on
remand. Id. at 23a-24a.
This case does not fall "within the 'limited set of
situations in which [this Court has] found finality as to
the federal issue despite the ordering of further pro-
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ceedings in the lower state courts.'" Jefferson, 522
U.S. at 82; see Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975). Of the four Cox Broadcasting categories, see
id. at 477-483, the one most arguably relevant here is
the fourth, which includes cases in which "reversal of
the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of
action," id. at 482-483. The present case, however,
does not appear to meet that description. Even if this
Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed the
Utah Sµpreme Court's non-preemption holding, respondent might nevertheless prevail on one of her
remaining defenses.
Several of those defenses appear to be tied to the
question whether ReconTrust was "authorized" under
Utah law to conduct the foreclosure sale. See Resp.
Utah S. Ct. Br., 2011 WL 11556544, at *12-*16 (Nov.
3, 2011). That question would become moot if this
Court granted review and held that Utah law did not
govern ReconTrust's authority to foreclose. But respondent's other defenses to foreclosure, left unresolved by the Utah Supreme Court, would require
resolution even if the federal issue were decided in
petitioner's favor. See Resp. Utah S. Ct. Reply Br.,
2012 WL 10194574, at *7 n.5 (July 27, 2012) (arguing
that petitioner was not the beneficiary of the trust
deed at the time of the foreclosure sale and therefore
was not in a position to make a credit bid for the property). Because reversal of the Utah Supreme Court's
ruling would not "be preclusive of any further litigation" regarding the validity of the foreclosure, Cox
Broad., 420 U.S. at 482-483, the decision below is not a
"final judgment" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
1257(a).
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B. A Substantial Question Exists As To The Timeliness
Of The Petition

Under 28 U.S.C. 2101(c), absent an extension of
time, a petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed
"within ninety days after the entry of * * * judgment," a requirement that this Court has described as
"mandatory and jurisdictional." Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990). In this case, the Utah Supreme
Court's judgment was entered on July 23, 2013, Pet.
App. la, making the petition due on October 21. Because petitioner waited until December 2 to seek an
extension of time in which to file, respondent argues
(Br. in Opp. 1-2, 6-7) that the petition is untimely.
Petitioner contends (Reply Br. 2-3) that the 90-day
filing ·period did not begin to run until the Utah Supreme Court denied its petition for rehearing on September 16, 2013. Under this Court's rules, if a rehearing petition is timely filed, or if the lower court "appropriately entertains" an untimely rehearing petition, the 90-day period for seeking this Court's review
begins to run when the lower court disposes of the
rehearing petition. Sup. Ct. R. 13.3. Petitioner's
rehearing petition in the Utah Supreme Court was
apparently untimely, since it was filed three days
beyond the 14-day period allowed under Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35(a). 2 Pet. App. 41a-43a. Petitioner argues (Reply Br. 2-3) that the Utah Supreme
Court nevertheless entertained the rehearing petition
because (1) the petition was received and circulated to
the court, despite the rule that an untimely rehearing
petition "will not be received by the clerk," Utah R.
2

Petitioner "maintains that the rehearing petition was timely"
(Reply Br. 3) but does not state the basis for that claim.
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App. P. 35(d); (2) the court denied the petition rather
than dismissing it, employing language in its order
similar to language used to deny timely petitions; and
(3) the court declined to act on respondent's motion to
strike the rehearing petition as untimely, and it has
not acted on respondent's request to clarify that the
petition was denied as untimely. According to petitioner, this treatment of the rehearing petition shows
that the petition was "assuredly 'entertain[ed]' by the
court below." Reply Br. 3 (brackets in original).
Although this Court has not precisely defined the
term "appropriately entertains" in Supreme Court
Rule 13.3, two of its precedents provide guidance. In
Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997), the 90-day clock
was deemed reset by a tardy rehearing petition when
the court of appeals had granted permission to file a
late petition, had treated it as timely, and had delayed
issuance of its mandate until the petition was denied.
Id. at 147 n.l. In Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004),
"[t]he Court of Appeals, on its own motion, recalled its
mandate and ordered the parties to brief the question
whether the case should be reheard en bane." Id. at
97. As this Court explained, the court of appeals'
briefing order in Hibbs, like the decision in Young to
entertain the untimely petition, shared a "key characteristic" with a timely rehearing petition: "All three
raise the question whether the court will modify the
judgment and alter the parties' rights." Id. at 98.
Thus, in both Young and Hibbs, the courts of appeals had expressly indicated, in orders issued before
the ultimate denials of rehearing, that they would
consider on the merits whether the cases should be
reheard. To be sure, no decision of this Court holds
that the circumstances identified by petitioner are
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insufficient to restart the 90-day deadline for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari. To accept the certiorari petition as timely in the present circumstances,
however, would substantially expand Supreme Court
Rule 13.3 beyond past practice.
C. The OCC Has Reasonably Interpreted Section 92a As
Applying The Law Of The State In Which A National
Bank Performs Certain Core Fiduciary Functions

Section 92a permits a national bank, when authorized by the OCC, to exercise fiduciary powers "when
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C.
92a(a). The OCC has reasonably interpreted that
language, and the other references to "State" in Section 92a, as referring to the State in which a national
bank performs certain core fiduciary functions. Under the OCC's approach, a national bank that performs those functions in one State must comply with
that State's law (and only with that State's law), even
if the trust property is located in another State. The
Utah Supreme Court held that, at least in cases involving the sale of real property, the national bank's
authority to perform trust functions must instead be
determined under the law of the State where the
property is located. That holding is incorrect.
1. "National banks are instrumentalities of the
Federal government," Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161
U.S. 275, 283 (1896), and they possess the powers
conferred on them by federal law. The OCC may
authorize a national bank to act as a fiduciary, 12
U.S.C. 92a(a), and it is undisputed that ReconTrust
received such authorization. The question is whether
ReconTrust's exercise of federally granted fiduciary
authority in the circumstances of this case would be
"in contravention of State or local law." Ibid.
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In the various National Bank Act provisions that
refer to state law, "the references to state laws occur
in conjunction with references to, or descriptions of,
the national bank's acting in a fiduciary capacity."
OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 5 (Oct. 8, 1999). 3
The most logical inference, and the one drawn by the
OCC, is that the statute uses the term "State"including in Section 92a(a)'s phrase "the State in
which the national bank is located"-to mean the
"state where it acts in a fiduciary capacity." Id. at 6.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
§ 101, 108 Stat. 2339, which permitted national banks
to establish branch offices across state lines. That
change in the legal regime, combined with "new technologies that greatly facilitate[d] the marketing and
delivery of fiduciary services to customers nationwide," produced an "increase in national banks' interstate fiduciary operations." 65 Fed. Reg. 75,875 (Dec.
5, 2000). As a result, the OCC received questions from
national banks about their authority to perform fiduciary activities in, and on behalf of customers from,
multiple States, as well as questions about the law
that would apply to those activities. See OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 872 (Oct. 28, 1999)4; OCC Interpretive
Ltr. No. 866; OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 695 (Dec. 8,
1995). 5
The OCC accordingly initiated a rulemaking to
"address[] the application of 12 U.S.C. 92a in the con3
Available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-andprecedents/oct99/int866. pdf.
4
Available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-andprecedents/dec99/int872. pdf.
5
Available at 1995 WL 788085.
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text of a national bank engaging in fiduciary activities
in more than one state." 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792. "The
purpose of the rulemaking was to provide clarity and
certainty for national banks' multi-state fiduciary
activities." Ibid. After soliciting and reviewing public
comments, the OCC promulgated regulations, now
codified at 12 C.F.R. 9.7, to govern "Multi-state fiduciary operations."
The regulations confirm that a national bank,
"[w]hile acting in a fiduciary capacity in one state,
* * * [may] act as fiduciary for[] customers located
in any state, and it may act as fiduciary for relationships that include property located in other states."
12 C.F.R. 9. 7(b). The regulations further provide
that, "[f]or each fiduciary relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the state in which the bank
acts in a fiduciary capacity for that relationship." 12
C.F.R. 9.7(d).
To determine where a national bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity," the regulations follow the approach
that the OCC had outlined in its prior interpretive
advice. 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792. That advice had concluded that "the best construction of the statute" was
to define the location of fiduciary activity as "the place
at which the bank performs core functions of a fiduciary." OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6. A fiduciary's "core functions include accepting the appointment, executing the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and making decisions regarding the
investment or distribution of fiduciary assets." Ibid.;
see 12 C.F.R. 9.7(d) (similar). Under widely accepted
principles of trust law, those "core functions" constitute essential features of a fiduciary relationship: its
establishment, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts
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§ 169 (1959) (trustee's duty to administer trust begins
"[u]pon acceptance of the trust by the trustee"); its
scope, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76(1)
(2007) ("The trustee has a duty to administer the trust
* * * in accordance with the terms of the trust.");
and its proper administration, see id. § 87 cmt. a
("The most important of the discretionary powers in
most trusts are those having to do with various aspects of the investment function, together with, in
many trusts, those having to do with discretionary
distributions.").
The OCC has also noted that its "core functions"
approach is "consistent with [the] analysis employed
by the courts and the OCC in other situations." OCC
Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6. For instance, federal
law permits a national bank to charge interest "at the
rate allowed by the laws of the State * * * where
the bank is located." 12 U.S.C. 85. For purposes of
that provision, a national bank that issues credit cards
is not "located" wherever its customers reside or
make their credit card purchases, which "would make
the meaning of [the] term 'located' too uncertain."
OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6 (citing Marquette
Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 311-313 (1978)). Similarly, a national bank's authority to operate a branch, see 12 U.S.C. 36, depends
on where "certain key bank activities" occur, not on
the location of the bank's interactions with customers.
OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6. To tie a bank's
fiduciary powers to the location of its customers
therefore "would be fundamentally inconsistent with
how national banks are permitted to exercise other
authorized powers." Id~ at 7.
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The OCC's core-functions approach to determining
the location of a national bank's fiduciary activities
thus is consistent with trust-law principles, with other
parts of the Act, and with the realities of modern
banking. It therefore is a "permissible construction of
the statute" by the agency charged with its enforcement, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984), and should accordingly be given deference, see Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 739 (1996) ("The Comptroller of the Currency
* * * is charged with the enforcement of banking
laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of the
rule of deference with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.") (citation,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
2. The Utah Supreme Court held that its own reading of Section 92a was compelled by the "plain meaning" of the statute, Pet. App. 10a-13a, and that the
OCC's regulation was unreasonable, id. at 18a-21a.
The court also held that its view was compelled by two
"clear statement" canons of statutory interpretation.
Id. at 14a-18a. Those holdings are erroneous.
a. This Court has recognized that "the term 'located,' as it appears in the National Bank Act, has no
fixed, plain meaning." Wachovia Bank, N.A. v.
Schmidt, 546 ·u.S. 303, 313 (2006); see id. at 318
("'[L]ocated,' as its appearances in the banking laws
reveal, * * * is a chameleon word; its meaning
depends on the context in and purpose for which it is
used."). In using such a plastic term, "Congress
* * * understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency." Smiley,
517 U.S. at 740-741.
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The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] national
bank is located in those places where it acts or conducts business." Pet. App. 12a. By itself, that statement is not logically inconsistent with the OCC's determination that a bank is "located" in the State
where it performs enumerated fiduciary activities.
The court went astray, however, in concluding that,
when a national bank sells trust assets as a trustee, it
"acts or conducts business" only in the State where
the property is located. Ibid.
Because Section 92a refers to "the State in which
the national bank is located," 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) (emphasis added), the most natural inference is that the
laws of a single State will apply to the management of
a particular trust. Because a single trust may contain
property located in several different States, the Utah
Supreme Court's property-based rule could subject a
national bank's conduct of a single fiduciary relationship to the laws of several different States-a result
that could "throw into confusion the complex system
of modern interstate banking." Marquette Nat'l
Bank, 439 U.S. at 312. The OCC's core-functions approach, by contrast, means that for each fiduciary
relationship, there is only "one state in which [a national bank] acts in a fiduciary capacity for purposes
of 12 U.S.C. 92a." 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792-34,793; see
id. at 34,795 (recognizing the need "to simplify the
determination of where a bank with multi-state operations is acting in a fiduciary capacity").
b. The Utah Supreme Court also erred in holding
that its interpretation of the statute was compelled by
two "clear statement" canons of statutory construction. Pet. App. 14a-18a.
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i. The presumption against construing statutes to
"alter the usual , constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government," Pet. 14a (citation omitted), has no application here. Because national banks derive their authority from federal law,
the scope of that authority is presumed to be set by
federal law and to preempt any inconsistent state law.
"[I]n the context of national bank legislation, * * *
grants of both enumerated and incidental 'powers' to
national banks as grants of authority [are] not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empt[], contrary state law." Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996). "[W]here Congress
has not expressly conditioned the grant of 'power'
upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such condition applies." Id. at 34.
In any event, the aCC's core-functions approach
"does not mean that national banks may engage in
fiduciary activities free from state-imposed restrictions. Rather, [it] simply identifies which state's
laws will apply." ace Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 7.
The regulations thus provide much-needed "clarity
and certainty for national banks' multi-state fiduciary
activities," 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792, while preserving an
appropriate role for state law.
ii. Any presumption against delegating "major
questions of policy" to an agency, Pet. App. 16a (quotation marks omitted), would be similarly inapplicable
here. Section 92a authorizes the ace "to grant [fiduciary powers] by special permit to national banks
applying therefor, when not in contravention of State
or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a). The statute itself thus
resolves the "major questions of policy," by making
clear both that national banks may exercise fiduciary
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powers and that they must do so in compliance with
state law.
Although the statute does~ not set forth a standard
for determining which State's law will apply to a particular fiduciary activity (beyond indicating that it is
"the State in which the national bank is located," 12
U.S.C. 92a(a)), Congress's intent to vest the OCC with
interpretive authority on this interstitial question is
beyond reasonable dispute. Section 92a empowers the
OCC "to promulgate such regulations as [it] may
deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this section and the proper exercise of the
powers granted therein." 12 U.S.C. 92a(j). Identifying the State whose laws will govern particular fiduciary activities is undoubtedly a prerequisite to determining whether a national bank has "proper[ly] exercise[ d]" its fiduciary authority. See Br. in Opp. 8-10.
c. The Utah Supreme Court suggested that, under
the OCC's core-functions approach, "a national bank
based in Texas . . . would have a competitive advantage over a national bank based in Utah as well as
Utah-chartered banks." Pet. App. 21a (citation and
brackets omitted). It is true that, under the OCC's
approach, some national banks may exercise fiduciary
powers with respect to property located in Utah in
circumstances where a Utah bank would be unable to.
That potential disparity, however, is merely the consequence of the "national banking system" that "Congress intended to facilitate." Marquette Nat'l Bank,
439 U.S. at 314-315 (citation omitted).
In Marquette National Bank, this Court interpreted a provision of the Act that authorized national
banks to charge interest "at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State in which the bank is 'located."' 439
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U.S. at 308 (quoting 12 U.S.C. 85). The Court read
that language as authorizing a national bank located in
Nebraska to issue credit cards to Minnesota residents
at interest rates that were consistent with Nebraska
law but were in excess of the rates permitted by Minnesota's usury laws. Id. at 313-314. The Court rejected the argument, made by a bank subject to Minnesota law, that this result would "upset[] the competitive
equality now existing between state and national
banks." Id. at 314. The Court observed that "such
inequalities" were a "necessary part" of the "system
of interstate banking" that Congress had created.
Ibid. Substantially the same analysis applies here.
D. The Decision Below Is In Substantial Tension, Though
Not In Direct Conflict, With An Unpublished Decision
Of The Tenth Circuit

Petitioner contends (Pet. 28-30) that the decision
below conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., 546 Fed. Appx. 736 (2013).
Although substantial tension exists between the two
decisions, the two are not squarely in conflict.
In Garrett, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
national bank had conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale of his Utah residence in violation of Utah law.
564 Fed. Appx. at 737. The plaintiff "argue[d] that
Section 92a, by its plain language, dictates that Utah
law, not Texas law, applied to the foreclosure sale of
[his] residence." Id. at 738. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Section 92a is ambiguous because it "provides no direction as to the critical question: in which
'State' is the national bank 'located' where, as here,
activities related to the foreclosure sale occur in more
than one state?" Ibid. The court accordingly resolved
the case based on the OCC's regulations, as well as on
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statements made by the ace in a brief filed at the
invitation of the court in another case, Dutcher v.
Matheson, 733 F .3d 980 (10th Cir. 2013). 6 See Garrett, 546 Fed. Appx. at 739-742.
The Tenth Circuit in Garrett granted the parties
leave to file supplemental briefs addressing the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in this case. 546 Fed. Appx.
at 739 n.l. The court ultimately declined, however, to
resolve the plaintiff's challenge to the validity of the
pertinent ace regulation because that challenge had
not been raised in a timely manner. Ibid.; see id. at
739 (explaining that, because the plaintiff had timely
"raise[d] arguments only as. to the meaning of [the
pertinent ace rule], and not to the reasonableness of
the regulations themselves," the court would "limit
[its] inquiry accordingly"). Because the Tenth Circuit
expressly reserved the question whether the ace
regulation is valid, no square conflict between the two
decisions exists. And because the decision in Garrett
is nonprecedential, the question presented here remains open within the Tenth Circuit. There is substantial tension between the two decisions, however,
because the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Section
92a(a) is ambiguous is logically irreconcilable with the
Utah Supreme Court's holding that "the plain meaning of the statute" compels application of Utah law.
Pet. App. 12a. 7
6

In Dutcher, the Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the district court had subject-matter
jurisdiction, without addressing the preemption issue presented
here. See 733 F.3d at 983,990.
7
Petitioner also suggests (Pet. 29-30) that the decision below
conflicts with the Fourth Circuit's decision in J aldin v. ReconTrust
Co., 539 Fed. Appx. 97 (2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
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E. Although The Question Presented Will Likely Warrant This Court's Review In An Appropriate Case, This
Is Not A Suitable Vehicle

The OCC's regulations constitute an integral part
of the national banking system, on which national
banks rely to determine their authority and legal
obligations. See Clearing House Ass'n Amicus Br. 8
("National banks rely heavily on the OCC's interstate
fiduciary regulations to provide fiduciary services on
an interstate basis to their customers, wherever such
customers, and their property, happen to be located."). The ruling below significantly undermines the
"clarity and certainty" that the OCC regulations are
designed to achieve. 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792.
In light of the jurisdictional obstacles identified
above (see pp. 8-12, supra), however, this case is not a
suitable vehicle for resolution of the question presented. And because the Utah Supreme Court is the only
appellate court that has squarely addressed a challenge to the validity of the OCC rule at issue here, this
Court's resolution of the question presented might
benefit from further consideration of the issue in the
lower courts. The Court therefore should wait to
address the issue in an appropriate case.

2293 (2014). The court in Jaldin held that Section 92a preempted
a Virginia statute that granted certain fiduciary powers to "state
banks, but not national banks that do not have their principal office
in Virginia." Id. at 101. Because Utah law does not permit state
banks to conduct nonjudicial foreclosures, the J aldin court's
primary rationale for finding preemption is inapplicable here.
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CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
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